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COMMENTS 
TURNING THE FAUCET BACK ON:   
THE FUTURE OF MCCAIN-FEINGOLD’S 
SOFT-MONEY BAN AFTER DAVIS V. FEDERAL 
ELECTION COMMISSION 
KEVIN J. MADDEN∗ 
There are two things that are important in politics.  The first is money, and 
I can’t remember what the second is. 
-Mark Hanna1 
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 1. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, MONEY AND FREE SPEECH:  CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 
AND THE COURTS 3 (2005) (quoting Mark Hanna).  Hanna represented Ohio in the 
United States Senate from 1897–1904, was chairman of the Republican National 
Committee, and was the most notorious political operative of his time.   
U-S-history.com, Mark Hanna:  Politics and Public Service, 1837–1904, http:// 
www.u-s-history.com/pages/h882.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Political contributions are the “mother’s milk of politics” and the 
“fuel” necessary for a successful political campaign.2  In the most 
recent presidential election, President Obama alone raised and spent 
nearly $750,000,000 in his pursuit of the White House.3   
This staggering amount of money renders Mark Hanna’s statement 
more accurate today than ever before.  The difference between 
Hanna’s era and today’s, however, is illustrated by the growing 
resentment toward, and congressional action against, the role of 
money in politics.4  Modern campaign finance laws have installed new 
rules that would have rendered Hanna’s political operation almost 
                                                          
 2. UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 3. 
 3. According to the Federal Election Commission (FEC), President Obama’s 
campaign had a total receipt of $747,800,000, while Senator McCain’s campaign had 
a total receipt of $351,600,000.  Overall, the FEC indicates that the aggregate total of 
contributions received by candidates running for President during the 2008 election 
cycle was $1,686,400,000.  Federal Election Commission, Presidential Campaign 
Finance:  Contributions to All Candidates by State, http://www.fec.gov/ 
DisclosureSearch/mapApp.do (last visited Dec. 1, 2009). 
 4. See generally Paul Edwards, Madisonian Democracy and Issue Advocacy:   
An Argument for Deregulating Private Funding of Political Parties, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 49, 
62 (2000) (arguing that the modern legislative trend of enacting restrictive campaign 
speech regulations is unconstitutional, while admitting that certain speech is not 
always desirable). 
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non-existent.5  These new laws regulating the role of money in 
political campaigns are some of the most intensely debated topics in 
the political world,6 pitting those who view political contributions as 
acts of free speech protected by the First Amendment against those 
who are weary of money’s corruptive influence.7 
The most recent piece of legislation enacted to reform campaign 
finance laws is the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002.8  
Better known as McCain-Feingold, after its two lead Senate sponsors,9 
the legislation amended existing campaign finance laws by closing 
several notorious loopholes.10  At the heart of the legislation was a 
new regulation banning political parties from spending or soliciting a 
type of political contribution known as “soft money.”11 
Soft money is a contribution to a political party or national 
campaign committee that is not earmarked for a specific candidate 
and is therefore not subject to the regulations of the Federal Election 
                                                          
 5. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 10–11 (acknowledging that Hanna was best 
known for his management of President McKinley’s presidential campaign and his 
work securing the staggering financial support of the business world, which would be 
forbidden under modern campaign finance regulations). 
 6. Compare 147 CONG. REC. S2439 (2001) (statement of Sen. McConnell)  
(“None of us really likes the degree to which outside groups get involved in our 
campaigns. . . .  We would like to control these campaigns.  But under the First 
Amendment, the campaign is not ours to control, and be it ever so irritating when 
some group who hates us comes in and starts talking . . . that doesn’t mean we can 
legislate it out of existence through our votes in this Chamber.”), with id. at S2434 
(statement of Sen. McCain) (“As long as the wealthiest Americans and richest 
organized interests can make the six and seven figure donations to political parties 
and gain the special access to power that such generosity confers on the donor, most 
Americans will dismiss the most virtuous politician’s claim of patriotism.”). 
 7. See Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law,  
in THE CONSTITUTION AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 201, 204 (Frederick G. Slabach 
ed., 1998) (acknowledging the inherent difference between the deliberative and 
pluralistic theories of government and claiming that individual preferences for either 
theory will determine individual analysis regarding the risks of corruption). 
 8. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 2 and 47 U.S.C.). 
 9. The bill’s sponsors were Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Russ Feingold  
(D-WI).  See Bernie Becker, Election Commission Decisions Deadlocking on Party Lines, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, at A16 (noting Senator McCain and Senator Feingold’s 
displeasure with the FEC’s partisan deadlock). 
 10. See generally Joseph Cantor & L. Paige Whitaker, Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002:  Summary and Comparison with Previous Law, in CAMPAIGN FINANCING AND 
AMERICA’S EVOLVING ELECTION SYSTEM 19, 21–22 (Collin V. Pantesh ed., 2007) 
(describing the major changes resulting from McCain-Feingold as (1) the enactment 
of a ban on the use of soft money by political parties and (2) the creation of a new 
category of election advertisements that could be regulated by the government). 
 11. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (2006) (“A national committee of a political party 
(including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party) may 
not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer 
of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the 
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.”). 
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Campaign Act.12  Prior to the enactment of McCain-Feingold’s  
soft-money ban, individuals and organizations such as labor unions 
and corporations made soft-money donations to support national 
political parties’ general activities.13  Political parties would then use 
the funds to support state and local party operations and bankroll 
issue ads that helped federal candidates by increasing voter turnout 
and raising name recognition.14  Unfortunately, the legitimate and 
worthwhile use of donations by political parties was also a means to 
leverage tremendous access to politicians and the political process.15 
McCain-Feingold amended past campaign financing laws and took 
soft money out of the political equation by instituting a new rule:  
“[n]on-Federal funds may not be used for the purpose of influencing 
any election for federal office.”16  The regulations also prevented 
national political parties, federal candidates, and federal office 
holders from soliciting, receiving, or directing individuals to 
contribute or donate soft money or anything of value that was not 
subject to the Federal Election Campaign Act’s contribution limits.17 
Subsequent to the Act’s enactment, the composition of the 
Supreme Court has shifted, and it now appears that the Court favors 
the deregulation of campaign finance laws.18  This shift presents 
serious questions about the future viability of McCain-Feingold’s  
                                                          
 12. See FEC Non-Federal Funds, 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(k) (2009) (indicating that soft 
money contributions are also known as non-federal funds because they are not 
subject to federal campaign finance regulations). 
 13. See S. REP. NO. 96-319, at 4 (1979) (stating that general party activities could 
be paid for with soft money as long as the contribution was not earmarked for a 
specific candidate); see also Ruth Marcus & Sarah Cohen, The Loophole Lesson in  
‘Soft Money’:  Campaign Reformers Confront History of Unintended Results, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 18, 2001, at A1 (listing soft money donations over the past decade by a variety  
of groups, including the security industry ($72 million), building industry  
($45 million), various labor unions ($59 million), individual donors (the largest gave 
$3.1 million), and corporations such as tobacco companies, energy companies, and 
pharmaceutical manufacturers). 
 14. See FEC Prohibited and Excessive Contributions:  Non-Federal Funds or Soft 
Money, 11 C.F.R. § 300.10 (2009) (attempting to restrict the uses of soft money). 
 15. See Katharine Q. Seelye & Alison Mitchell, Pocketing Soft Money Till Pocket Is 
Sewn Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at A1 (describing how soft money donors to 
President Clinton were awarded with lavish dinners and overnight stays in the 
Lincoln Bedroom). 
 16.  Prohibited & Excessive Contributions:  Non-Federal Funds or Soft Money,  
67 Fed. Reg. 49,064, 49,065 (Jul. 29, 2002). 
 17. 2 U.S.C. § 444i(a) (2006). 
 18. See Richard Hasen, Beyond Incoherence:  The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in 
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1065 (2008) (“Now, with the 
replacement of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
with Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, the pendulum has  
swung sharply away from deference toward perhaps the greatest period of 
deregulation . . . .”). 
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soft-money ban.19  The Court has heard several important cases 
regarding campaign finance issues,20 the most recent case being Davis 
v. FEC.21  In Davis, the Court held a provision of McCain-Feingold, 
known as the Millionaires’ Amendment,22 unconstitutional because it 
failed to meet the sole justification approved by the Supreme Court 
for regulating campaign speech—combating corruption—and 
unacceptably favored certain candidates over others.23 
The Roberts Court’s recent campaign finance holdings have 
formulated a stringent two-pronged anti-corruption test:  (1) the 
regulation must have an actual anti-corruption effect, and (2) the 
primary legislative intent motivating the regulation must be  
anti-corruption.24  This approach allows the Court to apply the proper 
level of judicial scrutiny in its political speech analysis.25 
McCain-Feingold’s total ban on the use of soft money fails to 
achieve an actual anti-corruption effect because it directs large 
financial contributions to unregulated third-party groups,26 and thus 
allows these groups and individuals to circumvent existing campaign 
finance laws.27  Additionally, the soft-money ban infringes on the 
rights of political parties and individuals, overshadowing its anti-
corruption purpose.28  The soft-money ban is similar to campaign 
                                                          
 19. See id. at 1106 (predicting that under the Roberts Court’s analysis a majority 
of campaign finance regulations will be found unconstitutional, leading to an almost 
complete deregulation of the system). 
 20. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 461 (2007) 
(concerning campaign speech that has been characterized as “express advocacy”); 
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (regarding state contribution and 
expenditure limitations). 
 21. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008).  The Supreme Court has heard a more recent 
campaign finance case, but it has yet to report an opinion.  Citizens United v. FEC, 
530 F. Supp. 2d. 274 (D.D.C. 2008) cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3469 (U.S. 2008)  
(No. 08-205). 
 22. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(i) (2006), invalidated by Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008) 
(allowing a candidate to accept individual contributions three times the statutory 
limit when their opponent contributed a certain amount of their personal fortune to 
their campaign). 
 23. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2770 (“[L]imits on discrete and aggregate individual 
contributions and on coordinated party expenditures . . . cannot stand unless they 
are ‘closely drawn’ to serve a ‘sufficiently important interest,’ such as preventing 
corruption . . . .” (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 136 (2003))). 
 24. See discussion infra Part II (discussing and applying the Roberts Court’s new 
test). 
 25. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771 (“When contribution limits are . . . too restrictive, 
we have extended a measure of deference to the judgment of the legislative body 
that enacted the law. . . . [B]ut limits that are too low cannot stand.”). 
 26. See infra notes 89–95 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that third-
party groups used unregulated funds). 
 27. Id. 
 28. See infra Part II.B.2. 
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finance regulations that the Supreme Court has recently struck down 
as unconstitutional because the intent was not primarily anti-
corruption, but rather the creation of preferences for certain 
speakers at the expense of others, namely the wealthy.29  The Roberts 
Court’s more exacting scrutiny of campaign finance regulations 
strikes back against the growing encroachment by Congress into the 
realm of campaign-related speech.30  This new analysis will seriously 
impact the future of campaign finance regulations because it opens 
the door for new challenges to a majority of the campaign finance 
regulations that make up the current system.31  The likely result will 
be a laissez-faire system of campaign finance regulations and a new 
approach to political campaigning.32 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s holding in Davis 
was correct and that, coupled with other recent campaign finance 
cases, it provides the necessary rationale to support a successful 
challenge to McCain-Feingold’s ban on the use of soft money by 
political parties.33  Part I discusses the legislative and judicial 
developments relating to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(FECA)34 since the 1970s, focusing on the changes affecting 
contributions and expenditures.  This Part will highlight the 
emergence of soft money, McCain-Feingold’s enactment and 
subsequent ban, and two seminal political speech cases:  Buckley v. 
Valeo35 and McConnell v. FEC.36  Part II compares and analyzes previous 
Supreme Court decisions with recent Roberts Court holdings and 
demonstrates that the environment surrounding campaign finance 
has evolved so that a total ban on the use of soft money by political 
parties is no longer constitutional, primarily because McCain-
Feingold fails to achieve a legitimate anti-corruption purpose and 
gives the legislature too much power to impermissibly influence 
                                                          
 29. See infra notes 142, 147 (explaining that the Court in Davis v. FEC found that 
the Millionaires’ Amendment prejudices wealthy candidates). 
 30. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 n.8 (stating that excessive congressional 
regulation will not lead to improved political speech). 
 31. See Hasen, supra note 18, at 1066–67 (speculating on the future of campaign 
finance regulations given the Roberts Court’s tendency toward deregulation). 
 32. Id. (describing how the deregulatory direction of the Court’s holdings will 
lead to successful challenges of campaign regulations). 
 33. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing the potential rationale the Roberts 
Court could rely on if it strikes down the soft money ban). 
 34. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as amended in scattered sections of  
2, 18, and 47 U.S.C.). 
 35. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 36. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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elections.37  This Comment concludes that the new anti-corruption 
analysis employed by the Roberts Court will ensure that the voters 
retain their constitutional right to be the final arbitrators in the 
American electoral system.38 
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGISLATION 
 AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE 
LEGISLATION 
A. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
Frustrated with the increasing amount of time devoted to 
fundraising and rising campaign costs, Congress enacted two major 
pieces of legislation in 1972 that forever changed campaign finance 
laws.39  The first, the Revenue Act, established the Presidential 
Campaign Fund in an attempt to lessen a candidate’s dependence on 
private funding.40  Second, President Nixon signed FECA into law 
with two main goals:  “tightening requirements and limiting 
expenditures for media advertising.”41 
FECA is the foundation for all modern campaign finance laws42 
and, at the time of its enactment, represented a shift in focus away 
                                                          
 37. See discussion infra Part II (arguing how the soft money ban encourages 
circumvention of existing campaign finance laws and was the result of a legislative 
intent to diminish the rights of a selected group). 
 38. See discussion infra Part II (arguing that the Roberts Court’s new analysis 
properly protects the constitutional rights of the voters and contributors). 
 39. Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (codified as amended 
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 991–997 (2006)); Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 
92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 18, and 47 
U.S.C.).  There were several motivating factors behind the enactment of these pieces 
of legislation.  As the cost of political campaigns continued to increase with the 
advent of television advertising, the amount of time spent fundraising also increased.  
See GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 184 (1980) (describing 
frustration on the part of Senators Edward Kennedy and Albert Gore, Sr. regarding 
the influence of television advertising, and specifically the negative impact it was 
having on congressional campaigns). 
 40. See FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, PUBLIC FUNDING OF PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTIONS, at 2 (1996), http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/public_funding_ 
brochure.pdf (explaining how the public presidential fund collects voluntary 
donations from tax payers (three dollars for single filers) and that each major party 
candidate that follows expenditure requirements receives fifteen cents for every 
person in the voting age population). 
 41. UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 41.  Urofsky further explains that the Nixon White 
House only agreed to support the legislation on the condition that its 
implementation be delayed until the 1976 elections.  Id. 
 42. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–455 (2006) (codifying portions of FECA into the most 
recent version of the United States Code); see also ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 20 (2005) (“The adoption of FECA signaled the 
beginning of the modern era of campaign finance reform. . . . The statute altered 
most of the major provisions of federal campaign law.”). 
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from campaign contribution and expenditure limitations in favor of 
provisions mandating disclosure and increased transparency.43  
Previous campaign finance regulations failed to provide a uniform 
system for the disclosure and tracking of contributions and 
expenditures, diminishing their ability to prevent corruption.44  As a 
remedy, FECA instituted specific filing requirements for both 
contributions and expenditures.45  Each candidate was required to file 
quarterly financial disclosure reports detailing every contribution or 
expenditure over $100.46  Drafters of the legislation were so optimistic 
that increased transparency would restrain the rising cost of 
campaigns that they eliminated previously enacted contribution and 
expenditure limitations.47 
Despite the drafters’ optimism, the disclosure requirements failed 
to offset the increasing cost of campaigns.48  The legislation did, 
however, facilitate the exposure of the most notorious political 
scandal in American history—Watergate—by providing a paper trail 
of contributors and corresponding contribution amounts that 
allowed investigators to follow the money.49  The discovery and 
                                                          
 43. See Joseph E. Cantor, Campaign Financing In Federal Elections:  A Guide to the 
Law and its Operation, in CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES:  ISSUES AND LAWS 
55, 63 (Auguste V. Anschutz ed., 2002) (indicating that the changes were intended to 
increase transparency by requiring disclosure reports that would track the names of 
contributors and where contributions were spent). 
 44. See id. at 58 (stressing the failures of previous campaign finance laws, 
specifically the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, because the disclosure requirements 
did not require financial reports for presidential or vice presidential candidates, 
political committees operating in only one state, or primary candidates).  During its 
entire tenure as the primary campaign finance regulation, no candidate for the 
House or Senate was ever prosecuted for violating the Federal Corrupt Practices Act.  
Id. 
 45. See generally 2 U.S.C. § 433 (requiring any political committee planning on 
spending more than $1,000 during a calendar year to file an organizational 
statement that includes the principal officers, scope of activities, and names of the 
candidates it supported); id. § 434 (requiring committees to file a report with 
information regarding any expenditure, loan, or contribution over $100). 
 46. See Cantor, supra note 43, at 62 (explaining that House candidates were 
monitored by the Clerk of the House, Senate candidates by the Secretary of the 
Senate, and presidential candidates by the Comptroller General and General 
Accounting Office). 
 47. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 41 (explaining the new law only preserved 
contributions prohibitions on corporations and labor unions). 
 48. See id. at 42 (explaining that the disclosure requirement was more successful 
at limiting media advertising). 
 49. See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER & BRIAN A. HAGGERTY, THE FEDERAL ELECTION 
CAMPAIGN ACT:  AFTER A DECADE OF POLITICAL REFORM 23 (1981) (stating the 
disclosure requirements helped bring major campaign violations against Nixon’s 
Committee to Re-Elect the President). 
  
2009] THE FUTURE OF MCCAIN-FEINGOLD’S SOFT-MONEY BAN 393 
 
subsequent investigation of Watergate50 provided the momentum to 
reform FECA and to adopt a new approach that featured a 
combination of disclosure requirements and new, tougher 
contribution and expenditure limitations.51 
B. Watergate Strikes Again:  The 1974 Amendments to the  
Federal Election Campaign Act 
The 1974 amendments created a “souped-up FECA.”52  In other 
words, Congress responded to public pressure53 and amended the 
Watergate-exposed shortcomings of FECA with more encompassing 
regulations.54  Specifically, the amendments shifted the focus back 
toward strict campaign contribution and expenditure limitations55 
                                                          
 50. See E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ, BUCKLEY STOPS HERE:  LOOSENING THE JUDICIAL 
STRANGLEHOLD ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 23–24 (Century Foundation Press 
1998) (describing examples of corruption, including the selling of ambassadorships 
for large political donations and the creation of bogus corporations to hide 
contributors and contribution amounts). 
 51. See discussion infra Part I.B (describing the FECA amendments enacted after 
the Watergate scandal). 
 52. ROSENKRANZ, supra note 50, at 24.  The amendments improved numerous 
provisions in the previous law by requiring candidates to establish one central 
campaign committee.  Id.  The amendments also created an independent 
enforcement agency—the Federal Election Commission (FEC).  Congress tasked the 
FEC with monitoring and developing campaign finance regulations.  In the hope of 
fostering a bipartisan approach to future regulations, the new law required that the 
commission be made up of six members appointed to six year terms, and that no 
more than three members of the commission could be from the same political party.  
2 U.S.C. § 437(c) (2006). 
 53. See ROBERT E. MUTCH, CAMPAIGNS, CONGRESS, AND COURTS:  THE MAKING OF 
FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 46 (1988) (stating that members of Congress were 
blitzed by constituents demanding changes to campaign finance laws after being 
motivated by the mainstream press and pro-reform lobbyists).  Specifically, Common 
Cause, a citizen lobbying group and a leader in the effort to reform campaign 
financing laws, won an important court ruling establishing its right to bring 
challenges to existing campaign finance laws on behalf of the American people.   
See Common Cause v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 333 F. Supp. 803, 812–13  
(D.D.C. 1971) (finding a private right of action under the Hatch Act because voters 
concerned about corruption in campaign financing were the intended beneficiaries 
of the statute). 
 54. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 
§ 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263 (amending 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1971)) (imposing additional 
limits on the amount of money that could be made through contributions in federal 
elections). 
 55. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)–(b) (imposing limitations based on the candidate’s 
desired political office and state demographics; capping individual contributions at 
$1,000 per candidate up to $25,000 in total for all federal candidates in one election 
cycle; and limiting contributions by political committees to $5,000 “with respect to 
any election for federal office”). 
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while also maintaining the disclosure requirements included in the 
original statute.56 
The 1974 amendments represented a broad attempt to regulate 
campaign costs, eliminate corruption, and restore faith in our 
electoral process, but were also highly controversial.57  The new laws 
created significant burdens for candidates attempting to challenge 
incumbents by making it more difficult for these individuals to raise 
money and increase name recognition.58  First Amendment 
challenges were immediately brought against the new contribution 
and expenditure limitations59 by conservatives and liberals alike.60  
The Supreme Court ultimately decided the issue in the keystone 
political speech case, Buckley v. Valeo. 
C. Money is Speech:  The Buckley Decision 
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court set the standard for all 
future political speech cases by allowing statutorily imposed 
limitations on contributions while simultaneously prohibiting any 
limitations on campaign expenditures.61  Buckley v. Valeo was brought 
by a diverse group of challengers and was heard by the United States 
                                                          
 56. Cantor, supra note 43, at 63 (asserting that the changes in the law enacting 
strict contribution and expenditure limits were in direct response to Watergate). 
 57. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 49 (identifying numerous constitutional 
problems raised by the legislation, including the legitimacy of publicly funded 
campaigns and the probable failure of the legislation to curtail corruption).   
The amendments incorporated many of the changes to campaign finance laws that 
reformers had lobbied for before and after Watergate.  Id. at 46. 
 58. See JACOBSON, supra note 39, at 186–87, 193 (noting that many Senators and 
Representatives admitted they would not have been elected if they first ran for office 
under the spending limits because of the difficulty they would have had raising 
funds).  Incumbents have been able to raise significantly more money than their 
challengers because they are a known quantity and can use their elected office for 
leverage.  Id.  Conversely, many challengers who wished to be competitive had to be 
personally wealthy and willing to spend significant amounts of their own fortune to 
help finance their campaign.  See Joel Gora, Buckley v. Valeo:  A Landmark of Political 
Freedom, 33 AKRON L. REV. 7, 24 (1999) (discussing the relationship between the 
enactment of contribution limitations and the high success rates of incumbents). 
 59. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 52 (asserting that it was the advocates for free 
speech who opened the door for a court challenge). 
 60. See ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS:  WHAT WENT 
WRONG AND WHY 49 (2000) (explaining how an aide to Senator James Buckley 
identified the advantages of filing a joint suit with individuals from across the 
political spectrum because it would bring greater publicity and provide political 
cover). 
 61. See Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Restricting Political Campaign Speech:  The Uneasy Legacy 
of McConnell v. FEC, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 839, 843 (2003) (describing Buckley v. Valeo as 
a “landmark decision” because of the Court’s refusal to limit campaign expenditures 
while admitting that the government had a significant interest in the prevention of 
corruption through limiting contributions). 
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.62  The circuit 
court rejected the majority of the challengers’ arguments, holding 
that the law did not violate the constitutional right of free speech 
because there was a “clear and compelling interest in safeguarding 
the integrity of elections.”63  The challengers appealed to the 
Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley created the 
legal framework for all future interpretations of campaign finance 
regulations by holding that political contributions receive less First 
Amendment protection than campaign expenditures.64  In rejecting 
both the “conduct” and “time, place, and manner” tests as 
justifications for the campaign finance laws,65 the Court held that 
political contributions and expenditures are examples of speech that 
“operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment 
activities.”66  Despite this sharp rebuke of previous tests, and stalwart 
defense of the importance of all campaign-related speech, the Court 
held that contributions and expenditures are different.67  Relying on 
a distinction between “substantial” and “marginal” restrictions, the 
Court found that contribution and expenditure limitations invoked 
the right of political speech in different ways.68  Expenditure 
limitations substantially limited speech and served no legitimate 
                                                          
 62. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1976) (listing the amendment’s 
challengers as ranging from conservative Senator James Buckley to liberal 
presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy). 
 63. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d per curiam,  
424 U.S. 1 (1976).  But see id. at 832 (holding § 437a to be “unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad” because it could require groups or individuals who have no 
connection to the election to file expenditure reports because they took part in a 
discussion on public issues). 
 64. See Wendy Fritz, Note, Campaign Finance Reform After Colorado Republican II:  
The Constitutionality of the Campaign Reform Act’s Soft Money Ban, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
183, 185 (2002) (stating how the Buckley holding shaped future legislation). 
 65. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15–18 (rejecting the argument that the O’Brien 
conduct test applied to campaign finance laws because the expenditure of money 
was not similar to the burning of a draft card and did not reduce the level of judicial 
scrutiny traditionally required in First Amendment cases (citing United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968))); see also id. at 18 (stating that while the 
regulation had a neutral application, a time, place, and manner restriction did not 
apply because FECA expenditures and contribution restrictions impose a direct 
restriction on the quantity of speech (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563-564 
(1965))). 
 66. See id. at 14 (stressing that the First Amendment affords broad protection to 
political expression because of the need to ensure the free flow of ideas that spur 
social and political change (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))). 
 67. See id. 19–21 (arguing that contributions only express a general view of 
political expression, while expenditures by candidates represent direct examples of 
political expression). 
 68. See id. (explaining that the expenditure limitation would essentially limit 
debate and discussion during a campaign, while contribution limits do not impose 
such direct limitations but only inhibit symbolic support). 
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government purpose.69  The Court held that contribution limits do 
not directly implicate First Amendment rights because contributions 
only express a general view of support, and individuals have 
alternative means of expressing their political speech rights.70 
Shifting its focus to the challenged legislation, the Court became 
more specific about its choice to differentiate the treatment of 
contributions and expenditures.71  The Court held that it was 
“unnecessary to look beyond the Act’s primary purpose—to limit the 
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large 
individual financial contributions.”72  The contribution limits were 
tailored to accomplish what the Court held to be a sufficiently 
important governmental interest.73  The Watergate scandal directly 
influenced the Court, which expressed its concerns regarding the 
corruptible influence of large financial contributions at the “quid pro 
quo”74 level, as well as the importance of preventing the mere 
appearance of corruption.75  The Court reasoned that limiting 
contributions by individuals to candidates was justified because 
preventing actual or perceived corruption would protect the sanctity 
of the electoral process and only narrowly interfere with the right of 
political expression and speech.76  Furthermore, the Court explained 
that contribution limitations did not prevent individuals from 
personally expressing their support for a candidate or the candidate’s 
ideas through volunteer activities and public discussion.77 
                                                          
 69. See id. at 57 (holding that expenditure limitations were effectively a legislative 
effort to determine which political views were important). 
 70. See id. at 19–21, 53 n.58 (declaring that contributions are different from 
expenditures because contributions do not directly facilitate speech). 
 71. See id. at 19–21 (distinguishing the marginal burden imposed by limitations 
on contributions compared to the more substantial burden created by limiting 
expenditures). 
 72.  See id. at 25–26 (rejecting two additional government interests presented by 
the government:  reducing the influence of affluent individuals and groups in the 
election process and curbing the rising cost of elections).  Further discussion of the 
Supreme Court’s anti-corruption rationale will be analyzed infra Part II. 
 73. See id. at 21–22 (stating that contribution limits did not reduce funds 
available for political expression and only required candidates to solicit contributions 
from a larger donor base). 
 74. See id. at 27 (acknowledging the fear that large unregulated donations in 
exchange for favors would undermine the integrity of American politics and its 
democratic system). 
 75. See id. (arguing that the appearance of corruption from large financial 
contributions was just as dangerous to the political process as actual corruption). 
 76. See id. at 28–29 (stressing the multiple opportunities individuals have to assist 
in party activities, including volunteering). 
 77. See id. at 28 (rationalizing the allowance of contribution limits because of its 
ability to confront the problem of corruption, while still respecting individuals’ 
various rights to associate with a political party). 
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Conversely, the Court struck down all of the expenditure 
limitations because they “impose direct and substantial restraints on 
the quantity of political speech.”78  The Court held that the 
limitations on expenditures were a “severe restriction[]” on the rights 
of candidates because they limited the candidates’ ability to engage in 
political expression and association by significantly curtailing the 
means of disseminating a candidate’s message and views to the 
public.79  Finally, the Court noted the only discernable reason for the 
enactment of expenditure limitations was to control the rising costs 
of political campaigns, which the Court found to be an insufficient 
government interest to justify infringing First Amendment rights.80 
Buckley’s contribution-versus-expenditure distinction was 
immediately controversial81 because many thought (and continue to 
think) that there is no legitimate First Amendment difference 
between contributions and expenditures.82  The current controversy 
regarding soft money was a result of the distinction between 
contributions and expenditures and the Court’s choice to apply 
different First Amendment protections.83  After the Buckley decision, 
Congress amended the legislation to stand as a constitutionally viable 
campaign finance law.84 
                                                          
 78. See id. at 39 (stating that expenditure limitations accomplished one thing, 
limiting political expression (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968))).  
Specifically, the Supreme Court struck down three sections of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act:  the limitations against independent expenditures, the limitation on 
the use of personal funds, and the ceiling on total campaign expenditures.  Id. 
 79. See id. at 19–23 (distinguishing the type of speech exercised through 
expenditures from that of contributions and explaining that expenditure limitations 
hamper numerous aspects of political communication since virtually all methods of 
communicating with the public require spending money). 
 80. See id. at 57 (finding that while the cost of campaigns rose three hundred 
percent over the past twenty years, the mere fact that such an increase occurred is 
not substantial enough for the government to impose limitations on spending). 
 81. Compare id. at 58 (reiterating that contribution limitations serve a government 
interest by preventing actual or perceived corruption and only marginally infringe 
on First Amendment rights, while expenditure limitations do not serve an important 
enough government interest to justify their infringement on First Amendment 
rights), with id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Yet when it approves similarly 
stringent limitations on contributions, the Court ignores the reasons it finds so 
persuasive in the context of expenditures.  For me contributions and expenditures 
are two sides of the same First Amendment coin.”). 
 82. See Gora, supra note 58, at 24 (arguing that the Court’s contribution-versus-
expenditure distinction fails to address several problems with contribution 
limitations, including:  acting as a “defacto [sic] restraint” on expenditures, 
overwhelmingly benefiting incumbents, and forcing money into unregulated areas). 
 83. See discussion infra Part I.D–F (discussing the rise of soft money and 
subsequent attempts to control it). 
 84. See generally Frank Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought, in IF BUCKLEY FELL:  A FIRST 
AMENDMENT BLUEPRINT FOR REGULATING MONEY IN POLITICS 11, 12 (E. Joshua 
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D. Congressional Reaction to Buckley and the Rise of Soft Money 
Congress had to rework FECA to come into conformity with the 
Buckley opinion.85  In 1979, Congress attempted to fine-tune the 
campaign finance laws.86  The purpose behind the 1979 amendments 
was to relieve some of the burdens imposed on individuals, 
candidates, and state and local committees by FECA requirements.87  
The majority of changes had little effect on substantive campaign 
finance laws, but the relaxation of one provision did lead to the 
increased use of soft money, which quickly became the primary 
political tool used by political parties.88 
The amended provision allowed unlimited and unregulated 
contributions to national political parties provided they were not 
earmarked for a specific candidate and were directed toward party-
building activities; these funds became known as “soft money.”89  State 
and local political committees were allowed to spend unlimited funds 
toward “get out the vote” efforts for presidential and other federal 
elections activities.90  Subsequently, the FEC implemented a rule 
                                                          
Rosenkranz ed., 1999) (stating that the goals of the 1974 FECA amendments were 
never achieved because of the Court’s decision in Buckley). 
 85. See id. at 12–13 (discussing the broad scope of the 1974 FECA amendments 
but noting “[t]hat imposing regulatory edifice never went into effect” because 
“[g]reat chunks of it fell to the Supreme Court’s assault in Buckley v. Valeo in 1976”).  
Congress again amended FECA in 1976, and these amendments remained the basis 
for campaign finance laws until after the turn of the century.  Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).  The amendments increased the 
individual contribution limit, overhauled the FEC, and required that Political Action 
Committees (PACs) could only solicit contributions from members of the PAC or 
defined constituent groups.  UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 62. 
 86. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187,  
93 Stat. 1339 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 87. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979:  Hearing on Amendments to 
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 Before the S. Comm. on Rules and Administration, 
96th Cong. 8–9 (1979) (statement of Robert Tiernan, Chairman of the Federal 
Election Commission) (recommending amending the Federal Election Campaign 
Act to give political parties a strengthened role in the political process where 
volunteer activities will be encouraged); S. REP. NO. 96-319 at 4 (1979) (arguing that 
previous versions of the Federal Election Campaign Act failed to consider the impact 
of regulations on political parties). 
 88. See H.R. 5010, 96th Cong. § 101(9)(B) (1979) (allowing political parties to 
use soft money for activities designed to encourage individuals to vote). 
 89. See S. REP. NO. 96-319, at 4 (“The bill would permit a State or local committee 
of a political party to pay the costs of certain campaign material used in connection 
with volunteer activities on behalf of candidates, without the cost constituting a 
contribution or expenditure under the act, so long as party funds were not 
earmarked for a particular candidate.”). 
 90. See Prohibited and Excessive Contributions:  Non-Federal Funds or Soft 
Money, 11 C.F.R. § 100.14 (2009) (stating that funds used by local and state political 
parties and local and state candidates are not bound by federal regulations). 
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change allowing national political parties to pay for some state and 
local party activities with unregulated soft money.91  Parties 
circumvented statutorily imposed limitations and stockpiled large 
sums of contributions by soliciting soft-money donations from 
individuals and groups.92  The donations were then stored in non-
federal accounts and transferred to state and local committees  
to cover general party building or administrative activities.93   
The emergence of soft money allowed political parties to use 
federally regulated hard money exclusively to support specific federal 
candidates.94  This tactic encouraged the use of soft money 
contributions for everything else.95 
Subsequently, many campaign finance reformers focused their 
efforts on eliminating the use of soft money.96  Reformers argued that 
soft-money contributions allowed political parties to circumvent 
existing campaign finance laws by collecting large contribution 
                                                          
 91. Transfers of Funds:  When Registration and Reporting Required, 11 C.F.R.  
§ 102.6(a)(2) (1977); Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 1978-10 (1978); Op. Fed. Election 
Comm’n 1979-17 (1979). 
 92. See Jason Conti, Note, The Forgotten Few:  Campaign Finance Reform and Its 
Impact on Minority and Female Candidates, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 99, 130 (2002) 
(explaining that use of soft money was directly linked to the revitalization of state 
and local political parties). 
 93. See L. Paige Whitaker, Campaign Finance:  Constitutional and Legal Issues of Soft 
Money, in CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES:  ISSUES AND LAWS 31–32 
(Auguste V. Anschutz ed., 2002) (explaining that soft money transferred from 
national political parties pays for state and local party activities, including grassroots 
and voter mobilization efforts that assist federal candidates). 
 94. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 67 (describing how an excess of soft money 
replaced federally regulated hard money as the main source of party financial 
support).  One of the largest uses of soft money contributions was to finance issue 
ads.  The Supreme Court held that ads that did not directly advocate for the election 
or defeat of a particular candidate were issue ads, and government regulation could 
not limit their funding.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 n.52 (1976) (explaining 
that issue ads could not be regulated because limitations on expenditures only 
applied to ads that “clearly identified [a] candidate for federal office”).  Thus, the 
limitations would only apply to “communications containing express words of 
advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot 
for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”  Id. 
 95. See Whitaker, supra note 93, at 33 (explaining that during the 1995–1996 
election cycle the FEC reported that both major political parties increased soft 
money expenditures by over two hundred percent from the 1992 election cycle);  
THE CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER, THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE 11 (2004), 
http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/attachments/1223.pdf [hereinafter CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE GUIDE] (displaying a chart depicting the rapid growth of soft money 
donations recorded by the two major political parties between 1992 and 2002). 
 96. See generally CAMPAIGN FINANCE GUIDE, supra note 95, at 4–15 (discussing the 
various attempts to reform campaign finance laws starting in the 1980s and how the 
McCain-Feingold Act was sparked as a result of the questionable practices of the 1996 
election cycle). 
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amounts and transferring them to state and local political parties.97  
The emergence of soft money was seen as a dramatic step backwards 
in the battle to reform campaign financing laws because it undercut 
both contribution limitations and transparency requirements enacted 
by previous statutes and upheld by the Supreme Court.98  Eventually, 
a few members of Congress, overcoming strong opposition from 
politicians and interest groups, secured congressional and executive 
approval for a new law instituting a total ban on the use of soft money 
by political parties.99 
E. Turning Off the Faucet:  The Bipartisan Campaign Finance  
Reform Act of 2002 
The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act—better known as 
McCain-Feingold—completely revamped campaign finance laws and 
closed the door on the use of soft money to influence federal 
elections.100  At the heart of the new legislation were two main 
provisions:  a total prohibition on the solicitation and use of soft 
money101 and new restrictions on media advertising, or 
“electioneering communication.”102 
The most significant contribution of the legislation was to amend 
existing campaign finance laws to prevent national political parties 
                                                          
 97. See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text (discussing the way soft money 
funds can be used to finance issue ads). 
 98. See Editorial, Campaign Reform on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at A30 
(arguing that parties exploited the soft money loophole and were underwriting 
individual campaigns with soft money contributions). 
 99. The members of Congress who led efforts to overhaul the campaign finance 
laws were bipartisan teams in both Houses of Congress:  Senators John McCain  
(R-AZ) and Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Representatives Martin Meehan (D-MA) and 
Christopher Shays (R-CT). 
 100. See Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux:  Buckley v. Valeo to FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, 2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 77, 77 (2007) (“The Act imposed 
extensive new regulations on and restrictions of campaign finance practices.”); 
Kuhne, supra note 61, at 845 (stressing how McCain-Feingold was the most ambitious 
and aggressive statute enacted to reform campaign spending).  The legislation was 
first introduced seven years before it was eventually signed into law in 2002.  
Editorial, Election Law Coup d’Etat, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2002, at A18. 
 101.  See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (2006) (“A national committee of a political party 
(including a national congressional campaign committee of a political party) may 
not solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution, donation, or transfer 
of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the 
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.”). 
 102. See id. § 434f(3) (defining an electioneering communication as “any 
broadcast, cable, or satellite communication,” that “refers to a clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office”).  Additionally, the legislation prevents corporations 
and unions from using general treasury funds to make a “contribution or 
expenditure in connection with any election to any political office” including any 
communication categorized as electioneering communications.  Id. § 441b. 
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and congressional campaign committees from soliciting and 
spending soft money.103  Candidates were also forbidden from raising 
or directing soft-money contributions for generic party-building 
activities.104  Although the legislation did increase the amount 
individuals and groups could contribute in hard money,105 both sides 
of the political aisle attacked McCain-Feingold as an unconstitutional 
infringement on the First Amendment right of free speech.106 
F. The Supreme Court Backs the Reformers:  McConnell v. FEC 
In its 2003 decision in McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court upheld 
McCain-Feingold’s ban on the use of soft money by political parties.107  
The first test of the soft-money ban was a consolidated challenge by 
various individuals and groups and was heard by a three-judge panel 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.108  
The district court upheld the ban on the use of soft money only when 
the money was used for federal election activities or for the financing 
of issue ads.109  Opponents of the soft-money ban immediately filed an 
appeal, which quickly rose to the United States Supreme Court.110 
                                                          
 103. See id. § 441i(a)(1) (clarifying that national political parties could only 
receive donations “subject to the limitations, prohibitions, and reporting 
requirements of this Act”). 
 104. See id. § 441i(b)(C) (emphasizing that soft money cannot be transferred 
between national, local, and state political parties). 
 105. See id. § 441a(a) (limiting individual contributions to a candidate for an 
election to $2,000; to a national political committee to $25,000; to a state political 
committee to $10,000; and to any other political committee to $5,000).  The 
legislation also limited an individual to $37,500 in contributions, in the aggregate, to 
candidates and political committees.  Id. § 441a(a)(3)(A).  The contribution limits 
were indexed for inflation.  Id. § 441a(c).  The FEC recently announced that 
contribution limits for the 2010 election cycle will be increased; individual donors 
will now be able to donate $2,400 per election (primary and general) and $30,400 to 
national parties.  Reid Wilson, Campaign:  Contribution Limits Raised for ‘10 Cycle, HILL, 
Jan. 23, 2009, http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/2112-contribution-limits-
raised-for-10-cycle. 
 106. See Constitutional Issues Raised by Recent Campaign Finance Legislation Restricting 
Freedom of Speech Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary,  107th Cong. 15 (2001) (statement of Nadine Strossen, President of the 
American Civil Liberties Union) (“Simply put, these bills are a recipe for political 
repression because they egregiously violate longstanding rights of free speech and 
freedom of association . . . .”). 
 107. See 540 U.S. 93, 141–42 (2003) (extending the ban on the use of soft money 
to all uses intended to influence federal elections). 
 108.  McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 177 (D.D.C. 2003), aff’d, 540 U.S. 93 
(2003). 
 109. Id. at 187. 
 110. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 191–92 (explaining that the Supreme Court 
modified its schedule to ensure a hearing of oral arguments and an opinion before 
the next election). 
  
402 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:385 
 
In a voluminous decision spanning 167 pages and including 
separate opinions by five Justices,111 the Supreme Court expanded the 
district court’s ruling and banned the use of soft money in all 
situations.112  Applying the Buckley contribution-versus-expenditure 
distinction,113 the Court found that donations of soft money were 
“contributions” and thus could be limited.114  The Court reasoned 
that banning soft-money contributions did not unconstitutionally 
infringe on First Amendment rights because, like the contributions in 
Buckley, they “entail[] only a marginal restriction upon the 
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.”115  
Furthermore, the Court rejected arguments that banning the use of 
soft money unconstitutionally interfered with political parties’ right 
to associate at the national and state levels.116  In rejecting these 
arguments, the Court noted that the limits only prevented national 
parties from spending or soliciting soft money and not from entering 
into joint planning opportunities with local and state offices.117 
The Court also upheld portions of McCain-Feingold that prevented 
the circumvention of the soft-money ban.118  The Court upheld the 
prohibition on “soft-money washing” transfers from national political 
parties to local and state committees because “[p]reventing 
                                                          
 111. Justices Stevens and O’Connor jointly, as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Breyer wrote opinions for the Court, while Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Stevens each wrote separate opinions.  
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 114, 224, 233, 247, 264, 286, 350, 363. 
 112.  See id. at 144–45 (Stevens and O’Connor, JJ.) (holding that because the use 
of soft money allowed contributors to circumvent the law, those contributions were 
also unconstitutional). 
 113. See id. at 120–21 (stating that the majority opinion followed the contribution-
versus-expenditure distinction established in the Buckley opinion). 
 114. See id. at 142–43, 145 (acknowledging that the majority applied lower judicial 
scrutiny to contributions).  The Court explained that actual corruption is not only 
quid pro quo relationships but also those where individuals enjoy undue influence 
upon candidates and officeholders.  Id.  The Court maintained that “common sense 
and the ample record in these cases” clearly show that large financial contributions 
have a corruptible influence or at least present the appearance of corruption that 
would jeopardize the public faith in our political system.  Id. at 145. 
 115. Id. at 134–35 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976)).  The majority 
required contributions to be so low that they prevented party candidates from being 
able to effectively compete in any given election before those limits would be 
considered as creating an unconstitutional burden.  Id. at 135 (citing Buckley,  
424 U.S. at 21). 
 116. See id. at 160 (stating that individuals were still allowed to volunteer and 
support political parties in a variety of ways). 
 117. See id. (rejecting the concept that prohibiting political parties’ use of soft 
money contributions will negatively affect party operations because state, local, and 
national parties were free to sit and discuss strategy). 
 118. See id. at 174 (describing congressional efforts to prevent circumvention of 
contribution limits as “entirely reasonable”). 
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corrupting activity from shifting wholesale to state committees and 
thereby eviscerating FECA clearly qualifies as an important 
governmental interest.”119 
The holding laid down by the Court in McConnell was an 
acceptance of a broad reading of the anti-corruption rationale.120  
This decision seemingly allows Congress to take a larger role in 
regulating federal elections by deciding which people or groups will 
have the most influence.121  The Court’s analysis and holding in 
McConnell exhibited greater deference to Congress, which many 
consider an overextension of the Buckley holding.122  Specifically,  
it signaled a departure from the strict anti-corruption purpose that 
the Court required in Buckley and other campaign finance cases.123  
Subsequently, the Roberts Court’s campaign finance holdings have 
readjusted the trajectory of campaign finance jurisprudence to align 
more closely with Buckley’s application of First Amendment rights for 
campaign speech. 
II. LOOSENING THE FAUCET BY TIGHTENING THE TEST 
The Roberts Court’s new campaign finance analysis conflicts with 
previous holdings, which applied the anti-corruption standard more 
broadly and allowed more congressional leeway.124  The Court has 
employed a cautious approach in announcing its new analysis 
                                                          
 119. Id. at 165-66; see also id. at 175–77 (stating that without this provision political 
parties would be able to avoid the limitations of the new law, and the same problems 
of corruption would only shift toward third-party organizations). 
 120. See id. at 287 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s opinion 
expanded on Buckley and compromised First Amendment protections).   
One example of the negative effects of the legislation includes the law’s preference 
for certain speakers.  Id. 
 121. See id. at 137 (majority opinion) (deferring to the “expertise” of Congress in 
this area). 
 122. Election law expert Professor Richard Hasen argues that “McConnell 
represented the most important in a series of New Deference cases in which the 
Court continued to speak the anticorruption language of Buckley but whose holdings 
appeared in serious tension with the anticorruption rationale.”  Hasen, supra note 
18, at 1071. 
 123. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 291–92 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
Buckley focused on actual quid pro quo corruption and not the broader definition of 
corruption advanced by the majority). 
 124. See Rachel Gage, Comment, Randall v. Sorrell:  Campaign-Finance Regulation 
and the First Amendment as a Facilitator of Democracy, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 341, 351 
(2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court in McConnell and Nixon v. Shrink Mo. 
Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), took an extra step that the Buckley Court was 
unwilling to take—accepting a lower standard of judicial scrutiny for contribution 
limits and making it acceptable to grant the legislature greater leeway in deciding 
what regulations would prevent corruption). 
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through recent campaign finance holdings.125  Despite its soft 
rhetoric, the Roberts Court developed a new test for examining 
campaign finance regulations:  whether the regulation has an actual 
anti-corruption effect and whether the legislative intent was primarily 
anti-corruption.126  The Roberts Court’s new test is more consistent 
with what many would argue is the proper protection of individual 
First Amendment rights.127  This section uses the Court’s two most 
recent campaign finance cases, Davis v. FEC128 and Randall v. Sorrell,129 
to demonstrate the Roberts Court’s test.130  This section then applies 
the new test to McCain-Feingold’s soft-money ban and demonstrates 
how the soft-money ban fails to meet this more exacting and 
protective view.131 
A. Strict and Narrow:  The Roberts Court’s  
New Anti-Corruption Standard 
The Roberts Court’s approach strictly examines campaign finance 
regulations to ensure that First Amendment rights are only minimally 
affected when a challenged regulation is motivated by an actual  
anti-corruption intent132 and has an anti-corruption effect.133   
The Supreme Court has held that the only legitimate justification for 
imposing contribution limits is the prevention of actual or perceived 
                                                          
 125. See Hasan, supra note 18, at 1105 (arguing that Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito have been sensitive to prior precedent while still clearly invoking a 
deregulatory approach). 
 126. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008) (finding no anti-corruptive 
purpose behind the Millionaires’ Amendment and rejecting the legislative intent to 
create an equal playing field as a valid justification for the amendment); Randall v. 
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 253 (2006) (stressing a study by a political scientist finding that 
the regulations lacked an anti-corruptive effect and unconstitutionally limited the 
ability of the state political parties to support their candidates). 
 127. See Frederick Schaeur & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First 
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1809-11 (1999) (acknowledging that the majority of 
academics and members of society view the First Amendment as an absolute right). 
 128. 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008). 
 129. 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
 130. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771–73 (ruling that the appropriate test for campaign 
finance regulations requires the law to be motivated by an anti-corruption intent and 
have an anti-corruptive effect). 
 131. See infra Part II.B (discussing how the ban on soft money fails to have an anti-
corruptive effect and that its intent was primarily to diminish the ability of the 
wealthy to participate in political expression). 
 132. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773 (arguing that the intent of the Millionaires’ 
Amendment was not anti-corruption because even Buckley recognized that a 
politician’s use of his own money posed no possible threat of corruption). 
 133.  See id. (explaining that without any potential for corruption, the legislation 
cannot possibly have any anti-corruptive effect). 
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corruption because they both equally shake the foundation of the 
public trust in the electoral process.134 
During congressional debate, the sponsors of McCain-Feingold 
made explicit references to the relationship between soft-money 
contributions and corruption to bolster the chances of constitutional 
approval.135  When the ban on the use of soft money was before the 
Supreme Court, the majority in McConnell found the sponsors’ 
argument persuasive;136 however, the composition of the Court has 
changed.137  The Court’s recent campaign finance cases have 
narrowed its view of acceptable anti-corruption regulations and set 
the stage for a reexamination of previously upheld regulations, 
including the soft-money ban.138 
Most recently, the Court heard Davis v. FEC and struck down  
a previously untested portion of McCain-Feingold139 as 
                                                          
 134. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 28–30 (1976) (arguing that there is a public 
interest in eliminating the dangers of large financial contributions); see also Davis, 
128 S. Ct. at 2770 (noting that limits on campaign contributions serve the important 
government interest of preventing corruption); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143 
(2003) (recognizing that in addition to direct bribery, large contributions can also be 
used to exercise undue influence over elected officials); FEC v. Colo. Republican 
Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (expressing 
the opinion that bypassing campaign finance laws to donate unlimited amounts of 
soft money to candidates gives, at the very least, an appearance of corruption); Nixon 
v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 390 (2000) (reaffirming the reasoning in 
Buckley that large financial contributions can give the appearance of corruption). 
 135. See 147 CONG. REC. 3864 (2001) (statement of Sen. Feingold) (“I am sorry the 
Senator from Kentucky does not want us to talk about it, but the Court says we can’t 
do a bill about it unless we do talk about it.  So we are going to talk about it.  We are 
going to talk about corruption, but, more importantly, what is much more obvious 
and much more relevant is the appearance of corruption.  It is what it does to our 
Government and our system when people think there may be corruption even if it 
may not exist.”). 
 136. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154 (asserting there is “substantial evidence” that 
large financial contributions to political parties are corruptive). 
 137. Justice Kennedy, the new swing vote, has indicated in previous campaign 
finance cases that he supports a broader First Amendment protection for 
contributions.  See id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that McCain-
Feingold’s new laws force individuals away from speaking through political parties 
and organizations); Nixon, 528 U.S. at 406 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is 
up to the Supreme Court to address the unintended consequences of their previous 
decisions, which have led to a deterioration of First Amendment protections for 
political contributions); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 
696 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (denouncing the majority opinion upholding a 
Michigan law that institutes criminal penalties when a nonprofit corporate speaker 
supports or opposes a candidate for office as being “repugnant to the First 
Amendment and contradicts its central guarantee, the freedom to speak in the 
electoral process”). 
 138. See Hasen, supra note 18, at 1105 (discussing how recent campaign finance 
decisions by the Roberts Court will lead to more successful challenges of campaign 
finance regulations, including the soft money ban). 
 139. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 229–30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part) 
(arguing that the individuals who challenged the Millionaires’ Amendment lacked 
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unconstitutional.140  The provision, commonly known as the 
“Millionaires’ Amendment,” allowed a “non-self financing” candidate 
to receive contributions three times larger than normally allowed 
when his opponent’s self-contributed funds exceeded $350,000.141  
The Supreme Court held that the Millionaires’ Amendment was 
unconstitutional because it did not have a legitimate anti-corruption 
purpose and its true intent was to diminish the rights of the 
wealthy.142 
Justice Alito’s majority opinion indicates the new direction of the 
Roberts Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence.143  The Court found 
that the regulation did not serve a legitimate anti-corruption purpose 
because the use of personal funds did not increase the risk of 
corruption.144  Because the use of private funds did not raise any fear 
of corruption, the Court determined that the provision had no anti-
corruption effect.145 
The Court also determined that the intent of the provision lacked 
an anti-corruption purpose.146  The Court declared that the 
Millionaires’ Amendment was “antithetical to the First Amendment” 
because the real intent was to eliminate a wealthy candidate’s alleged 
advantage.147  Justice Alito labeled the regulation as a punishment on 
wealthy candidates because it “impos[ed] different contribution and 
                                                          
standing because there was no cognizable injury resulting from the application of 
McCain-Feingold). 
 140. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008) (analyzing the First 
Amendment violation that resulted because the Millionaires’ Amendment had no 
anti-corruption purpose or effect). 
 141. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(C) (2006); see Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2767 (explaining that a self-
financer would still be required to adhere to normal contribution limits but that a 
non-self-financing candidate could receive $6,900 from individuals). 
 142. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 (holding the regulation serves no anti-corruption 
purpose). 
 143. See id. at 2772–74 (asserting that the use of personal funds poses no threat of 
corruption). 
 144. See id. (arguing that if Congress found that increasing the limits for non-self 
financers did not invoke fears of corruption, “it is hard to imagine how the denial of 
liberalized limits to self-financing candidates can be regarded as serving 
anticorruption goals sufficiently to justify the resulting constitutional burden”).  
Additionally, the Court disproved any similarities between limitations upheld by 
Buckley and the Millionaires’ Amendment because the statute in question requires 
that a person either abide by a personal expenditure limit or allow his opponent to 
enjoy liberalized contribution restrictions.  Id. at 2772. 
 145. See id. at 2771 (asserting that limiting a candidate’s ability to contribute to his 
own campaign clearly violates the First Amendment). 
 146. See id. at 2773 (stating that the Court has never upheld campaign finance 
regulations that were intended solely to equalize electoral opportunities). 
 147. See id. at 2774 (distinguishing the intent of the Millionaires’ Amendment 
from the contribution caps set forth in Buckley because the Millionaires’ Amendment 
only prevents the wealthy from freely self-financing). 
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coordinated party expenditure limits on candidates vying for the 
same seat”148 and it required certain types of candidates to make a 
false choice between providing support for their campaign and 
allowing their opponent to ignore contribution rules.149  In so 
holding, the Court rejected the argument that the Millionaires’ 
Amendment was necessary to correct previous regulations that 
imposed significant burdens on candidates and fed the “public 
perception that wealthy people can buy seats in Congress.”150   
The Court said this objective went beyond the scope of Congress’s 
ability to regulate campaign finance and infringed on voters’ role in 
the electoral process.151 
The narrow application in Davis built off of the holding in Randall 
v. Sorell, where the Supreme Court held for the first time that 
contribution limits were unconstitutional because they were too 
low.152  In Randall, the Court struck down Vermont’s Act 64 because 
the contribution limits failed to have an anti-corruption effect.153  
Applying Buckley,154 the Court agreed that contributions could be 
limited but held that some limits “may fall outside tolerable First 
Amendment limits.”155  The Court found “danger signs present”156 
with the Act’s two-hundred-dollar-per-election-cycle limitation on 
contributions (to candidates running for governor) because they 
were “well below the limits this Court upheld in Buckley.”157   
                                                          
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 2772 (explaining that if a candidate’s personal expenditures 
triggered the new contribution rules for the opposing candidate, then the opposing 
candidate would be able to drown out the wealthy candidate). 
 150. Id. at 2774. 
 151. See id. at 2773–74 (arguing that these types of regulations grant too much 
leeway to Congress). 
 152. 548 U.S. 230, 237 (2006).  The Court held that the expenditure limits 
instituted by the Act were the same type the Court had rejected in Buckley and were 
unconstitutional because there was no sufficient government justification to limit the 
quantity of political expression.  Id. at 244–45. 
 153. See id. at 236–37 (holding the act unconstitutional because it was inconsistent 
with the First Amendment).  The Act limited expenditures to various amounts based 
on the scope of the office—from $300,000 for campaigns for Governor to $2,000 for 
single member state representative districts.  Id. at 247.  Contributions by individuals, 
organizations, and parties were limited to $400 for statewide offices, $300 for state 
senate offices, and $200 for state representative offices.  Id.  The Act also limited 
contributions to political parties to $2,000 for each election cycle.  Id. 
 154. Id. at 247. 
 155. See id. at 253 (identifying the problems with the legislation as:  restricting 
challenger’s ability to run against incumbents; limiting political parties to the same 
contribution levels as candidates, including volunteer expenses as campaign 
contributions; and setting a record low maximum contribution level without 
adjusting for inflation). 
 156. Id. at 249. 
 157. Id. at 250. 
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The Court rejected Vermont’s argument that the limitations qualified 
as anti-corruption regulations because reducing the amount of time a 
candidate spent fundraising would prevent corruption.158 
Even though the Court agreed that the suggested purpose of the 
legislation carried some merit, it held that the act was not sufficiently 
tailored to meet those goals without overly affecting core First 
Amendment rights.159  Vermont’s contribution limitations were 
unconstitutional because they substantially interfered with an 
individual’s ability to raise funds and be competitive, prevented 
political parties from helping their candidates, and restricted the 
ability of individual citizens to volunteer.160  The holdings in Davis and 
Randall clearly project the strict analysis the Roberts Court will apply 
to future campaign finance cases. 
The Court narrowed its examination of campaign finance laws by 
focusing on both the effect and intent of the regulation, which allows 
the Court to apply the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.161  
Arguably, both the Millionaires’ Amendment and Vermont’s Act 64 
fulfilled some anti-corruption purpose.162  The Millionaires’ 
Amendment limited the perception that only the wealthy can be 
candidates for federal office.163  Vermont’s Act 64 reduced the 
amount of time a candidate would need to devote to fundraising and 
the solicitation of funds, which limited the opportunity for actual 
corruption and exposure to donors who would ask for political 
                                                          
 158. See id. at 245–46 (holding that Vermont’s limits were too restrictive because 
they inhibited the ability of candidates to run effective campaigns). 
 159. See id. at 261-62 (stressing that the Act was not narrowly tailored to survive 
constitutional scrutiny because it disproportionately burdened the First Amendment 
rights of the people of Vermont). 
 160. See id. at 253-61 (explaining the rationale through five points:  (1) the 
contribution limit will restrict the amount of funding available to challengers;  
(2) requiring political parties to comply with the same low limits will infringe on 
their right to associate; (3) the act fails to exclude expenses of campaign volunteers 
from campaign contributions; (4) contribution limits are not adjusted for inflation; 
(5) the contribution limit is so low it produces a serious burden). 
 161. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2772 (2008) (holding that the Millionaires’ 
Amendment “imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of the First Amendment 
right[s] . . . [and] cannot stand unless it is ‘justified by a compelling state interest’” 
(quoting FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986))); Nixon v. 
Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 428 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“‘[P]reventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate 
and compelling government interests thus far identified for restricting campaign 
finances.’” (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985))). 
 162. But see Davis, 128 S. Ct at 2773 (holding that the burden imposed by the 
Millionaires’ Amendment on First Amendment speech rights is not justifiable); 
Randall, 548 U.S. at 248 (arguing that contribution limits that are set too low may 
harm the political process). 
 163. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773 (rejecting the government’s argument that this 
treatment was necessary to fix the current system). 
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favors.164  While the current Supreme Court agrees that “a measure of 
deference”165 should be extended to the legislatures that enacted the 
law, it has also been more exacting with its review, providing stronger 
First Amendment protections.166  The Roberts Court now examines 
campaign finance laws to see if the regulation’s anti-corruption 
purpose has a legitimate effect on preventing corruption and 
whether the legislative intent of the regulation was broader than its 
anti-corruption purpose, placing it outside the bounds of 
constitutional protection.167 
The Roberts Court has struck down campaign finance regulations 
when it determines that the actual effects of the regulations have 
little to do with the prevention of actual or perceived corruption.168  
Previously, the Court was not concerned with actual empirical 
evidence regarding anti-corruption regulations,169 but in Randall the 
Court explicitly referenced the work of a political scientist to show 
that the alleged anti-corruption regulations failed to achieve their 
anti-corruption purposes and instituted overly burdensome 
regulations on candidates and political parties.170  Similarly, in Davis, 
the Court held that a candidate using personal funds lacked any 
plausible corruptible influence that would justify the “penalty” 
imposed on these candidates and the “resulting drag” on their First 
                                                          
 164. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 245–46 (dismissing Vermont’s argument that 
contribution limits alone fail to prevent corruption). 
 165.  Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771 (citing Randall, 548 U.S. at 248). 
 166. Compare Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2771 (questioning the goal of Congress when they 
enacted the Millionaires’ Amendment and how they hoped to achieve that goal), 
with Nixon, 528 U.S. at 386–87 (reinforcing a lower standard for contribution limits 
and deferring to the members of Congress to craft regulations they deem 
appropriate). 
 167. Compare Randall, 548 U.S. at 254 (relying on a political scientist’s expert 
testimony to show that the contribution limits had a significant impact on the ability 
of candidates to run an effective campaign and that the risk of actual or perceived 
corruption was so limited that it did not support the infringement on speech rights), 
with Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391 (confirming that a specific “quantum of evidence” 
showing corruption or the perception of corruption was not necessary). 
 168. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 248–49 (observing that a simple anti-corruption 
rationale cannot justify a “lower the limit the better” mentality; rather, there should 
be an “independent judicial judgment” to see if the restrictions are specifically 
tailored to pass a constitutional test). 
 169. See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 391 (rejecting the need for a minimum amount of 
evidence reflecting the corruptive nature of large financial contributions to satisfy a 
showing of a compelling government interest in regulating campaign contributions). 
 170. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 253–55 (relying on the work of political scientist Clark 
Bensen, which indicated a dramatic reduction in the amount of money available to 
candidates and parties, and linking it directly with the downward trend in the 
competitive nature of several races). 
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Amendment rights.171  This view differs from McConnell, which cited 
numerous stories relating to the corruptive influence of soft-money 
contributions but failed to show that the regulation would have any 
actual effect on preventing corruption.172  In his dissent in McConnell, 
Justice Kennedy argued that contributions to political parties “lack[] 
a possibility for quid pro quo corruption of federal officeholders”173 and 
regulation of party receipts fails to “equal regulation of quids to 
party’s officeholders.”174  By requiring that the regulation have an 
actual anti-corruption effect, the Roberts Court has narrowed the 
applicability of campaign finance regulations.175 
Additionally, the Roberts Court examined the legislative intent of 
the regulation.176  The majority in Davis was concerned about the 
“ominous implications” of broad anti-corruption campaign finance 
regulations, predicting the regulations would grant Congress too 
much influence in the electoral process.177  While Congress does have 
a role in protecting elections from “disorder,”178 that role does not 
                                                          
 171. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772 (noting that the statute should not discourage the 
use of personal funds because reliance on personal funds actually reduces the threat 
of corruption). 
 172. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 146–52 (2003) (noting that many 
lobbyists, CEOs, and wealthy individuals make donations to secure influence over 
federal officials, and recognizing the connection between soft money and the 
manipulation of the legislative calendar).  But see id. at 300–04 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the majority incorporated a faulty syllogism:  federal 
office-holders are linked with their political party, all party receipts create corrupt 
donor favoritism, thus regulation of these donations will prevent officer holders from 
being corrupt).  Justice Kennedy further contended that the majority only cited one 
example where a Senator felt pressure to conform with the ideals of a soft-money 
donor, and that this example differed from contributions to a party because the 
Senator was referencing contributions to his personal campaign committee.  Id. at 
302. 
 173. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 301 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (recognizing that 
independent party activity includes independent receipt and spending of soft 
money). 
 174. See id. at 300 (pointing out that not all monies a party receives are quids for 
party candidates and officeholders). 
 175. See generally Richard Briffault, WRTL and Randall:  The Roberts Court and the 
Unsettling of Campaign Finance Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 807, 843 (2007) (concluding that 
recent cases indicate the Supreme Court is unlikely to give significant deference to 
federal and state campaign regulations). 
 176. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773 (stressing that the government’s intent for the 
legislation was to create equal electoral opportunities for candidates with different 
personal wealth). 
 177. See id. at 2773–74 (“‘[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the 
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments’ 
and ‘may consider, in making their judgment, the sources and credibility of the 
advocate.’” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791–92 
(1978))). 
 178. See Timmons v. Twin City Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (noting 
that “[s]tates may . . . enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to 
reduce election- and campaign-related disorder”). 
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give the legislative branch the power to alter the very nature of 
representative politics by overextending its influence through 
attenuated anti-corruption regulations.179  Couching the Millionaires’ 
Amendment as a means to address and correct the perception that 
only the wealthy can be successful candidates for federal office did 
not overcome what the Court saw as the true intent of the 
regulation—“level[ing] electoral opportunities.”180  Justice Alito 
articulated the Court’s concerns by stating: 
Different candidates have different strengths.  Some are wealthy; 
others have wealthy supporters who are willing to make large 
contributions.  Some are celebrities; some have the benefit of a 
well-known family name.  Leveling electoral opportunities means 
making and implementing judgments about which strengths 
should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an election.  
The Constitution, however, confers upon voters, not Congress, the 
power to choose the Members of the House of Representatives . . . 
and it is a dangerous business for Congress to use the election laws 
to influence the voters’ choices.181 
Previous campaign finance cases have demonstrated the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to accept any regulation as long as the 
government could articulate how the regulation served any possible 
anti-corruption purpose.182  However, many of these regulations, 
including the ban on the use of soft money, had much broader 
implications and represented efforts by Congress to express 
“preferences for certain speakers.”183  Thus, the Roberts Court’s 
                                                          
 179. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 n.8 (dismissing the concept that regulation of 
political speech will lead to a higher quality of political speech); McConnell, 540 U.S. 
at 297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing the nature of the elected representative 
as built upon the financial support of candidates who support policies the 
contributor supports).  But see Lori Ringhand, Defining Democracy:  The Supreme Court’s 
Campaign Finance Dilemma, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 77, 83–84 (2004) (acknowledging the 
debate between those who view democracy as a pluralist system and those who see it 
as a civic republicanism and advocating for the adoption of the latter because it 
reduces the influence of interest groups and raises the level of political debate). 
 180. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773. 
 181. Id. at 2774. 
 182. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 136–37 (relying on the anti-corruption 
purposes of the bill to support upholding the regulation and choosing not to 
consider the risk of unintended consequences). 
 183. See id. at 287 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining that the new regulations 
imposed by the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act would have made Ross 
Perot’s efforts to build the Reform Party a felony and would have also made it a 
felony for environmental groups to run ads within sixty days of an election, while 
simultaneously enhancing the speech rights of corporate media corporations). 
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inclusion of an analysis of the legislative intent behind regulations 
will limit Congress’s ability to enact more sweeping measures.184 
The Roberts Court’s adoption and application of a strict and 
narrow anti-corruption rationale exposes previously upheld 
regulations to the correct constitutional scrutiny.  The ban on the use 
of soft money by political parties is now susceptible to new challenges 
because it raises issues similar to those that the Roberts Court 
recently addressed in Davis and Randall.185 
B. McCain-Feingold’s Soft-Money Bans Fails the Roberts Court’s New Test  
The ban on the use of soft money does not meet the searching 
anti-corruption analysis the Roberts Court has established.  First, the 
ban fails to have an actual anti-corruption effect because it does not 
eliminate the influence of large financial contributions and 
encourages circumvention of existing laws.186  Second, the ban also 
fails to have an anti-corruption effect because it infringes too far on 
the rights of political parties and contributors to justify a total ban on 
the use of soft money.187  Next, the section will show that the soft- 
money ban represents a choice by the legislature to diminish the 
rights of wealthy individuals to favor other individuals and groups.188  
The Roberts Court will likely hold McCain-Feingold’s ban on the use 
of soft money unconstitutional because the McCain-Feingold remedy 
is worse than the soft-money disease.189 
                                                          
 184. But see Randall v. Sorell, 548 U.S. 230, 261–62 (2006) (recognizing the need 
to defer to Congress in certain situations). 
 185.  See Hasen, supra note 18, at 1066–67 (speculating on the next likely 
challenges to campaign finance regulation and predicting their success). 
 186. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing how the increased role of independent third-
party groups in the electoral process negates the anti-corruption goals of the soft 
money ban). 
 187. See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining that soft money contributions to political 
parties lack the threat of corruption necessary to justify its negative effect on political 
parties). 
 188. See infra Part II.B.3 (asserting that the true purpose of the soft money ban was 
to reduce the ability of wealthy individuals to participate in the electoral process). 
 189. See 147 CONG. REC. 3853 (2001) (statement of Sen. McCain) (stating that the 
goal of the legislation was to eliminate the influence and appearance of special 
access to contributors). 
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1. The ban on soft money fails to eliminate the negative influence of large 
 financial contributions 
The actual effect of the soft-money ban is to encourage the 
circumvention of campaign finance regulations.190  An important 
rationale behind the McConnell holding was that a total ban on the 
use of soft money by political parties was necessary to protect against 
the creation of “soft-money surrogates.”191  The Court upheld 
provisions that prevented political parties from soliciting and 
directing large financial contributions to third-party groups because 
such actions undercut efforts to prevent corruption or the perception 
of corruption resulting from large financial contributions.192   
The Court failed to recognize that by upholding a total ban on the 
use of soft money by political parties it had effectively directed those 
same large financial contributions to unregulated third-party groups, 
circumventing the regulation.193 
While the growth of unregulated outside groups cannot be 
denied,194 many argue that the importance of eliminating the 
appearance of corruption justifies the total soft-money ban.195   
The potential for the appearance of corruption is more visible and 
dramatic when large contributions are given to political parties rather 
than to outside third-party groups.196  Thus, it is argued that while no 
actual corruption may be occurring, there is a societal interest in 
                                                          
 190. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 231 (“This law will not remove one dime from 
politics.  Soft money is not gone, it has just changed its address” (quoting Sen. Mitch 
McConnell)). 
 191. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 177 (2003). 
 192. See id. at 175 (expressing fears that many of the problems the legislation 
intended to remedy would be transferred to third-party organizations where they 
would be outside the scope of regulation). 
 193. See Sara Tindall Ghazal, Comment, Regulating Nonconnected 527s:  Unnecessary, 
Unwise, and Inconsistent with the First Amendment, 55 EMORY L.J. 193, 198 (2006) 
(arguing that the rise of 527 groups was related to the ban on soft money because 
Democrats were afraid that they would be unable to raise as many funds as the 
Republicans and began using 527 groups to circumvent the prohibitions). 
 194. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Democratic ‘Shadow’ Groups Face Scrutiny:  GOP, 
Watchdogs to Challenge Fundraising, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2003, at A5 (recognizing the 
rise of many new pro-Democratic organizations created in response to, and to fill the 
void created by, the soft-money ban). 
 195. See, e.g., Schauer & Pildes, supra note 127, at 1820 (arguing that the societal 
interest in preventing corruption warrants the application of an exceptionalist First 
Amendment theory allowing for the regulation of campaign contributions and 
expenditures just like many other areas of regulation having secondary First 
Amendment issues). 
 196. But see Kuhne, supra note 61, at 850 (asserting that the vague definition of 
what constitutes “corruption” and the “appearance of corruption” allow supporters 
of campaign finance regulations to label anything as being corruptive of the electoral 
process). 
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maintaining McCain-Feingold’s soft-money ban despite the 
unintended consequences associated with the inherently problematic 
nature of large contributions to a political party.197 
The ban on the use of soft money does not have an actual anti-
corruption effect because it trades one problem—large financial 
contributions to political parties—for another that is more damaging 
to the electoral process:  large financial contributions given to 
federally unregulated third-party groups that fund overtly negative 
and untrue advertisements without any connection to an established 
voter-accountable group, unlike a political party or candidate.198   
It follows that the influence of outside groups has a more corruptive 
effect on the political process than soft-money contributions because 
they cannot be held directly accountable by the voters.199 
The problem with McCain-Feingold’s soft-money ban is that it did 
not eliminate the influence of soft money—it only “changed its 
address.”200  The enactment and subsequent Supreme Court decision 
upholding the soft-money ban’s legality has directed large financial 
contributions away from political parties to unregulated third-party 
groups.201  Individuals who previously made soft-money contributions 
to political parties did so because they supported the overall goal of 
the party and wanted to help support their party’s efforts.202  The ban 
                                                          
 197. See Fritz, supra note 64, 200–01 (arguing that a functional and anti-
circumvention approach provides the rationale to support the soft-money ban 
because soft money is “tailor-made to undermine contribution limits,” and the ban is 
necessary to reduce the influence of large financial contributions that Congress and 
the Court have tried to eliminate). 
 198. See Scott Helman, Soft Money Battle Brewing:  Millions Raised; Attack Ads Set, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 6, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/ 
04/06/soft_money_battle_brewing/ (discussing the rise in independent spending 
and how third-party organizations are able to evade regulations and wield a great 
deal of influence on election day). 
 199. See Ann Gerhart, Ground War—Steve Rosenthal Wages a $100 Million Battle to 
Line Up Democratic Votes, WASH. POST, July 6, 2004, at C1 (highlighting that even 
though there is no direct connection between third-party groups and political 
parties, outside groups are tasked with vital responsibilities that political parties and 
candidates cannot legally participate in or afford, such as lining up new voters or 
coordinating expenditures between different groups). 
 200. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 231 (“This law will not remove one dime from 
politics.  Soft money is not gone, it has just changed its address.” (quoting Sen. Mitch 
McConnell)). 
 201. Cf. Randall v. Sorell, 548 U.S. 230, 247–48 (2006) (stating that some 
contribution limits may impose more harm than their alleged anti-corruption 
objectives justify). 
 202. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263–64 (1986) 
(suggesting that people contribute to political purposes because they support those 
purposes).  But see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 147 (2003) (reporting that many 
individuals who made soft money contributions made them to both political parties, 
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on the use of soft money by political parties forced these individuals 
to donate to unregulated third-party groups, whose influence is on 
the rise.203 
The emergence of third-party groups and their unregulated 
influence on the electoral process directly challenges the 
effectiveness of any anti-circumvention arguments the Court has used 
to support upholding the ban.204  Contributions to third-party groups 
circumvent the ban on the use of soft money by providing a means 
for those seeking to gain access and influence.205  Thus, large 
financial contributions can still be used to influence federal elections 
with far less scrutiny.206 
In addition to circumventing current campaign finance systems, 
these political ads enable outside groups to alter elections.  A modern 
example is the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth and the negative ads the 
group launched against 2004 Democratic Presidential Nominee 
Senator John Kerry, which many credit as being influential in his 
defeat.207  Many sponsors of those ads and others like them are not 
directly connected to a political candidate or party, placing them 
outside the reach of current campaign finance laws.208  The sponsors 
of the Swift Boat ads were also individuals who had previously given 
                                                          
indicating that they did not support the views of the party but rather were trying to 
secure political influence). 
 203. See John Samples & Patrick Basham, Op-Ed, Meet the New Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 2002, at A27 (describing the optimism of groups such as the Club for Growth 
and the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League that are outside 
the scope of federal regulations and anticipated a dramatic increase in contributions 
after the enactment of McCain-Feingold). 
 204. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 177 (finding that the statute’s solicitation 
restriction was closely drawn to prevent political parties from using tax-exempt 
organizations to circumvent regulation); see also FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican II), 533 U.S. 431, 465 (2001) (declaring that 
coordinated expenditures may be limited to prevent circumvention of existing 
campaign finance laws). 
 205. See Helman, supra note 198 (describing the Republicans’ need for outside 
groups to counteract the fundraising advantage of the Democrats and highlighting 
the successes of the previous ads in attacking the reputation and electoral chances of 
previous candidates). 
 206. See Ghazal, supra note 193, at 210–11 (noting the influence and power of 
various outside groups such as MoveOn.org and the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth 
during the 2004 Presidential election). 
 207. See Jim Rutenberg, Obama Campaign Wages Fight Against Conservative Group’s 
Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/28/us/politics/ 
28ayers.html (describing the efforts of President-Elect Obama’s campaign to prepare 
to confront outside attack groups, like the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, which were 
“widely believed to have damaged Mr. Kerry’s [electoral chances]”). 
 208. See Ghazal, supra note 193, at 197 (explaining that outside interest groups do 
not qualify as a political committee under the Federal Election Campaign Act and 
thus can receive unlimited contributions from individuals and groups). 
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large financial contributions to political parties, but were prohibited 
from doing so after the enactment of the soft-money ban.209 
The Swift Boat ads are a prime example of the serious corruptive 
influence third-party groups can have on an election.210  The 
advertisements are extremely negative and are often misleading or 
blatantly untrue.211  Moreover, the ads corrupt the political process 
because candidates can be sure the public hears negative 
advertisements that slander their opponent’s personalities and policy 
ideas, but still deny responsibility for them.212  Ultimately, the ban on 
the use of soft money by political parties created an unencumbered 
avenue for large financial contributions that have negative and 
corruptive influence on the electoral process because these third-
party groups can flood the national airwaves with negative and false 
advertisements that disenfranchise voters and slander candidates.213 
This unfortunate consequence of the soft-money ban prevents it 
from meeting the Roberts Court’s new anti-corruption analysis 
because it fails to have an actual anti-corruption effect.  The ban on 
the use of soft-money transfers the dangers intended to be remedied 
by the regulation to a more dangerous forum for corruption— 
these third-party groups are unregulated, can accept unlimited 
contributions, and cannot be held accountable by the voters.214   
The growing influence of third-party groups and the lack of 
regulations pertaining to these groups renders the soft-money ban 
effectively toothless, and the Roberts Court is unlikely to find a 
legitimate anti-corruption effect. 
                                                          
 209. See Helman, supra note 198 (emphasizing that the same individuals who 
funded the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth ads had been longtime Republican donors 
and are now using their soft money donations to fund outside groups that are 
unregulated by the federal government). 
 210. See Rutenberg, supra note 207 (stating the damaging effects of the Swift Boat 
ads on John Kerry’s 2004 Presidential Campaign). 
 211. See, e.g., Patrick Healy, Let’s Call a Lie a Lie . . . Finally, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2008, at 5 (discussing the difficulties candidates face when trying to react to lies and 
misleading ads in campaigns). 
 212. See Jim Rutenberg & Michael Luo, Interest Groups Step Up Efforts in a Tight Race, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at A23 (describing how both the McCain and Obama 
campaigns initially tried to discourage the activities of outside groups but ultimately 
turned a “blind eye” to their actions). 
 213. See Kuhne, supra note 61, at 857 (explaining that the limitations upheld by 
the Court in McConnell favor certain types of interest groups and further complicate 
campaign finance legislation, making it more difficult to run for office and easier to 
be susceptible to political damage). 
 214. See Ghazal, supra note 193, at 193 (describing the criticism of unregulated 
groups because they are outside the scope of the FEC and thus able to accept huge 
contributions from wealthy individuals). 
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2. The ban on soft money infringes on the rights of political parties and does 
 not achieve an anti-corruption effect 
The ban on soft money also fails to prevent corruption because the 
link between soft-money contributions to political parties and 
political corruption is too attenuated.215  The enactment of McCain-
Feingold’s ban was the most obtrusive and extreme route Congress 
could have taken in the wake of the explosion and overuse of soft 
money.216  Moreover, the ban has directly weakened the role of 
political parties.217  The Court has commented numerous times on 
the important role political parties play in the American electoral 
process.218  Specifically, political parties provide important 
organizational structure, help disseminate political information, and 
assist candidates who support the party’s ideas and policies become 
elected.219 
                                                          
 215. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican I), 
518 U.S. 604, 616–18 (1996) (finding that soft money donations to political parties 
pose little threat of corruption). 
 216. See S. Amend. 146 to The Bipartisan Campaign Finance Act of 2001, S. 27, 
107th Cong. (2001).  Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE) introduced the legislation on 
March 26, 2001 and it was tabled on March 27, 2001 by a vote of 52 yeas, 47 nays, and 
one not voting.  147 CONG. REC. 4605 (2001).  Senator Hagel’s alternative would have 
allowed an individual to donate $60,000 in soft money to political parties during 
each year of an election cycle.  In addition, it would have created more stringent 
regulations to monitor the amount of soft money contributions and to regulate the 
ratio state and local political committees could spend on federal election as 
compared with state and local elections.  S. Amend. 146 to The Bipartisan Campaign 
Finance Act of 2001, S. 27, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 217. See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The First Amendment Needs No 
Reform:  Protecting Liberty from Campaign Finance “Reformers”, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 785, 
816 (2002) (explaining how the enactment of McCain-Feingold has limited the 
advocacy, legislative, and organizational activities of political parties). 
 218. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican II), 
533 U.S. 431, 479–80 (2001) (emphasizing that parties do not simply elect 
candidates, but rather act as agents for spending on behalf of those who seek to 
produce obligated officeholders); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 
351, 358 (1997) (recognizing that the right to form political parties is protected by 
the First Amendment); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992) (recognizing that 
political parties enable like-minded voters to gather in pursuit of shared political 
goals); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 
(1989) (articulating the view that a state election law is unconstitutional if it burdens 
the rights of political parties and their members without advancing a compelling 
state interest); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 214–17 (1986) 
(asserting that although the First Amendment protects political parties’ important 
role in helping like-minded individuals further a common goal, Congress has the 
right to regulate political parties). 
 219. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 217, at 816 (quoting Haley Barbour, former 
Chairman of the Republican National Committee, who defined a political party as 
“an association of like-minded people who debate issues, who attempt to influence 
government policy, and who work together to elect like-minded people to local, State 
and Federal office”). 
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Despite the Court’s recognition of the importance of political 
parties, supporting the ban on their use of soft money is easy to 
understand.  First, political parties “made their own bed” by failing to 
police themselves and control the access and leverage provided to 
soft-money contributors.220  Their failure to do so undergirds 
arguments that the ban is necessary to prevent the appearance of 
corruption in wake of the public outcry surrounding the “Lincoln 
Bedroom” and other contribution-related scandals.221  Additionally,  
it is arguable that political parties’ role as associations of individuals 
who support certain political ideals has not been diminished or 
prohibited by the ban.222 
The Roberts Court appears poised to strike down campaign 
finance regulations even if they serve some anti-corruption purpose 
when the regulation prevents a political party from effectively 
supporting its candidates.223  McCain-Feingold’s soft-money ban has 
had a negative effect on the political parties’ ability to function 
because the ban has funneled resources away from political parties to 
unregulated outside groups.224  In Randall, the Court denounced the 
negative effects of Vermont’s Act 64, which constrained the ability of 
political parties to coordinate expenditures, accept contributions, 
and assist in pivotal races.225  Specifically, the Court emphasized the 
importance of allowing individuals to contribute to a party without 
specifying a candidate because expressing general support for a 
                                                          
 220.  Editorial, Campaign Reform on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2002, at A30 (arguing 
that the new law was necessary to stop political parties from using soft money 
contributions to get around campaign finance laws and also to ensure that all 
Americans can meaningfully participate in the electoral process). 
 221. Katharine Seelye & Alison Mitchell, Pocketing Soft Money Till Pocket Is Sewn Up, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at A1 (stating that big donors to the Clinton-Gore campaign 
were rewarded with stays in the Lincoln Bedroom). 
 222. But see Bopp & Coleson, supra note 217, at 820 (arguing that McCain-
Feingold’s regulations, specifically the ban on the use of soft money by political 
parties, prohibits the use of such funds for issue advocacy, legislative, and 
organizational purposes and treats political parties as “federal-candidate election 
machines,” ignoring the effect on other obviously important party activities). 
 223. See Randall v. Sorell, 548 U.S. 230, 257–58 (2006) (affirming the important 
role political parties play in electing candidates who share their political ideals and 
fearing that strict contribution limits could have a tremendous effect on the parties’ 
ability to reach their goals). 
 224. See Ruth Marcus & Juliet Eilperin, Campaign Bill Could Shift Power Away From 
Parties, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2001, at A1 (discussing the negative effects the soft-
money ban will likely have on political parties). 
 225. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 257–58 (explaining the ramifications of the law and 
how it would prohibit the party from using the collective sums of individual 
contributors to support candidates as the party saw fit). 
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political party was sufficient to invoke First Amendment association 
rights.226 
This important right, recognized by the Court in Randall, is the 
same right infringed upon by the ban on soft money.227  The ban 
significantly diminishes the ability of people to associate with political 
parties and, thus, to effectively support their candidates.228  
Limitations on contributions act as a “defacto [sic] restraint”229 on 
campaign expenditures, which the Court has routinely struck down.230  
Contribution limits have a direct effect on the amount a candidate or 
party is able to spend in an election and prevent challengers from 
running effective campaigns against entrenched incumbents who 
monopolize local political donors.231  By preventing soft-money 
contributions to political parties, McCain-Feingold advantages 
incumbents at the expense of challengers, which decreases the 
benefits of a competitive democracy.232  Furthermore, denying 
political parties the use of soft money to support legislative efforts 
prevents political parties from fully participating in one of their most 
historically important functions.233  The Roberts Court will likely view 
the total ban on the use of soft money as overly intruding on the 
                                                          
 226. Id. 
 227. The Court in Randall spoke in terms of small individual contributions ($20 or 
$40) to political parties.  Id.  While this differs from the large soft money 
contributions made prior to McCain-Feingold, the sentiment is the same because 
contributions that support the general activity of the political party and the 
association rights of individuals can be overly restricted by certain campaign finance 
regulations and can be found unconstitutional.  Id. 
 228. Compare McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 160–61 (2003) (rejecting any 
association infringement arguments against the ban on soft money because political 
parties are still able to meet and discuss strategy with local and state committees), 
with Bopp & Coleson, supra note 217, at 816 (describing two significant negative 
effects McCain-Feingold has had on political parties:  imposing federal election law 
limits on state and local parties and “drastically limit[ing] the issue advocacy, 
legislative, and organizational activities of political parties”). 
 229. See Gora, supra note 58, at 24 (arguing that the Court’s reasoning in Buckley 
for striking down limits on expenditures is applicable to contributions as well 
because the primary beneficiaries of contribution limits are personally wealthy 
candidates who are better able to expend large amounts than candidates who are 
“not well-connected or well-heeled”). 
 230. See Randall, 548 U.S. at 242 (stating that the Supreme Court has followed 
Buckley’s holding for the last thirty years). 
 231. See Kuhne, supra note 61, at 856 (noting that Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion properly indicates that soft money assists challengers more often than 
incumbents). 
 232. See Conti, supra note 92, at 132–34 (asserting that challengers, especially 
minority and female candidates, are disadvantaged by contributions limits). 
 233. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 217, at 820 (stressing the point that political 
parties are more than “election machines” and necessarily support a broad range of 
issue advocacy, legislative, and organizational activities). 
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important territory of political parties, which overshadows its anti-
corruption purpose.234 
Additionally, donations to political parties do not present the same 
risks of corruption as donations to particular political candidates.235  
Contribution limits were enacted to prevent actual quid pro quo 
relationships as well as instances of perceived corruption.236  In past 
decisions, the Supreme Court has held that political parties have 
never been seen as the purveyors of political corruption that they 
were painted to be by McCain-Feingold.237  Several of the Justices who 
upheld the soft-money ban in McConnell at one time admitted that 
the risk of corruption from soft-money contributions to political 
parties is “at best, attenuated,”238 because there is no direct 
connection between the contribution and the office holder.239 
Due to the obviously negative effect the ban has had on political 
parties, it will not meet the first prong of the Roberts Court’s new 
test.  Because the ban funnels financial support away from political 
parties and lacks a basis in a legitimate fear of corruption,  
the Roberts Court will likely find that the ban on the use of soft 
money fails to meet the first prong of its test and does not respect the 
constitutional rights of political parties.240 
                                                          
 234. See Hasen, supra note 18, at 1106 (predicting that the constitutionality of the 
soft money ban is in jeopardy because of the Roberts Court’s narrowing of acceptable 
justifications for infringements and the new respect it showed for the rights of 
political parties in Randall). 
 235. See FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican I), 
518 U.S. 604, 616 (1996) (citing FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 
470 U.S. 480, 498 (1985)) (reasoning that the danger a contribution will be seen as 
an effort to obtain a quid pro quo is no greater when made to a political party than 
to a Political Action Committee, whose expenditure limits the Court has held 
unconstitutional). 
 236. See UROFSKY, supra note 1, at 46 (describing the influence of Watergate on the 
enactment of the 1974 Amendments, which led to the decision in Buckley).  But see 
Kuhne, supra note 61, at 852 (distinguishing soft money from the type of “quid pro 
quo” corruption that is said to “justify contribution limits”). 
 237. See Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 616 (“We are not aware of any special 
dangers of corruption associated with political parties that tip the constitutional 
balance in a different direction.”); see also FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action 
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–500 (1985) (examining a Political Action Committee 
(PAC) and holding that a large PAC does not have the sufficient corruptive tendency 
to overcome the “fatally overbroad” restriction on expenditures). 
 238. Colorado Republican I, 518 U.S. at 616. 
 239. See Ghazal, supra, note 193, at 223–24 (stating that in the absence of 
coordination a large contribution is less likely to act as a corruptive influence 
because it is too attenuated from the candidate or government official). 
 240. See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 217, at 823 (citing Jacobus v. Alaska, 182 F. 
Supp. 2d 893 (D. Alaska 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 338 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 
2003)) (arguing that while the soft money ban may have some anti-corruption 
effects, there is no sufficient justification for allowing the government to prevent the 
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3. The ban on soft money intentionally diminishes the rights of wealthy 
 contributors 
The ban on the use of soft money intentionally limits the First 
Amendment rights of wealthy individuals in order to favor other types 
of individuals and groups.241  Individual participation in elections is a 
well-respected and protected right.242  The Court has held that it is 
imperative that individuals enjoy equal opportunity to express their 
views through the political process.243  Recently, in Davis, the Court 
has indicated the wealthy enjoy this same right.244  The main intent 
behind the ban on the use of soft money is similar to that of the 
Millionaires’ Amendment, which the Court recently struck down as 
unconstitutional, because both intentionally favor certain individuals 
and groups over wealthy individuals by directly limiting the ability of 
wealthy individuals and groups to participate in the electoral 
process.245 
Many scholars argue that any anti-corruption requirements should 
be disregarded because they fail to serve the best interests of 
                                                          
use of separate soft money accounts that can be used to support issue advocacy and 
voter mobilization). 
 241. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008) (holding regulations intending 
to “equaliz[e] the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome 
of elections . . . wholly foreign to the First Amendment” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)));  Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
694, 705 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he notion that the government has a 
legitimate interest in restricting the quantity of speech to equalize the relative 
influence of speakers on elections is antithetical to the First Amendment . . . .”). 
 242. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“[T]here is practically 
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free 
discussion of governmental affairs.  This of course includes discussions of 
candidates.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (“It is a prized 
American privilege to speak one’s mind . . . and this opportunity is to be afforded for 
‘vigorous advocacy’ no less than ‘abstract discussion.’”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
 243. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality 
opinion) (recognizing the right of different political views between two groups but 
not requiring that one group “be forced . . . to help disseminate hostile views”). 
 244. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 (listing wealthy supporters who will donate large 
amounts to a campaign as a strength for candidates that Congress should not 
diminish); see also Hasen, supra note 18, at 1105 (arguing that the Roberts Court will 
find that wealthy individuals have a “right[]” to make large donations to political 
parties). 
 245. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 (“Different candidates have different strengths.  
Some are wealthy; others have wealthy supporters who are willing to make large 
contributions.  Some are celebrities; some have the benefit of a well-known family 
name.  Leveling electoral opportunities means making and implementing judgments 
about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to the outcome of an 
election.  The Constitution, however, confers upon voters, not Congress, the power 
to choose the members of the House of Representatives.”); see also First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (“Government is forbidden to assume the 
task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern themselves.”). 
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society.246  Supporters of this approach argue for greater deference to 
the legislature in its pursuit of creating a better system.247  They argue 
that the soft-money ban is necessary to create a system grounded in a 
tradition of civic republicanism, which addresses societal interests.248  
By allowing the legislature more latitude in enacting broad laws, the 
Court will clear the way for improving electoral politics and benefit 
the country as a whole.249  A fierce tension fills the space between 
supporters of greater legislative restriction of campaign finance issues 
and those, including many members of the Supreme Court, who 
believe in the “individual rights first” approach.250  Although an 
approach favoring regulation has some attractive qualities, it fails to 
consider the larger impact that greater legislative deference could 
have on the electoral process.251 
The Millionaires’ Amendment and the ban on the use of soft 
money both disproportionately affect wealthy individuals and groups.  
The Millionaires’ Amendment “punished” wealthy candidates for 
federal office by forcing them to make a lose/lose decision:  either 
forgo using their own wealth to assist their candidacy or use their 
personal wealth and allow their opponent to disregard federal 
contribution limitations, which diminishes the effectiveness of a 
                                                          
 246. See, e.g., Ringhand, supra note 179, at 93–94, 112 (arguing that the fluidity of 
the corruption-based paradigm has created serious problems and uncertainty in 
campaign finance jurisprudence and negates members of the Court from fully 
expressing what the author argues is proper decision-making methodology). 
 247. See id. at 112 (arguing that because judicial reasoning in the area of campaign 
finance relies on certain unjustified preferences regarding democracy, deference to 
the legislative arena will allow for clearer and more consistent regulations). 
 248. See id. at 83–84 (describing how the goals of a civic republican system include 
reducing the influence of outside groups, raising the quality of political debate, and 
promoting political equality). 
 249. See Shauer & Pildes, supra note 127, at 1820, 1835–36 (asserting that the idea 
that campaign contributions and expenditures are protected by the First 
Amendment is “long on rhetoric and short on substance,” and advocating for an 
approach that would remove election-related speech jurisprudence from the sphere 
of First Amendment protection and allow for stronger regulation based on various 
policy reasons). 
 250. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Attention all citizens.  To assure the fairness of elections by 
preventing disproportionate expression of the views of any single powerful group, 
your Government has decided that the following associations of persons shall be 
prohibited from speaking or writing in support of any candidate . . . .  It is 
rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of [special advantages conferred 
on certain associations and individuals] the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”). 
 251. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008) (expressing concerns about the 
intrusion of government regulation on campaign and election-related speech 
because it would usurp the traditional role voters play in the American electoral 
experience). 
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wealthy candidate’s speech.252  Similarly, the ban on the use of soft 
money imposed by McCain-Feingold prevents wealthy individuals or 
groups from making financial contributions that are not earmarked 
for specific candidates.253  The soft-money ban then prevents political 
parties from spending these contributions on various campaigns and 
transferring contributions to state political committees for their use, 
as well as historically important party activities including legislative 
research, voter mobilization, and administrative activities.254  While 
wealthy individuals and groups are still allowed to contribute a 
sizeable amount of hard money to political parties, they are not 
allowed to contribute any soft money.255  This diminishes a wealthy 
contributor’s ability to exercise his support for general party 
activities.256  Both regulations directly impose substantial burdens on 
the rights of wealthy individuals and groups to engage in the political 
process. 
The enactment of the soft-money ban and the Millionaires’ 
Amendment are similar because they represent an unacceptable 
legislative choice.257  The Millionaires’ Amendment was a choice by 
the legislature to eliminate the alleged advantage wealthy candidates 
                                                          
 252. See id. at 2770 (introducing the argument that the Millionaires’ Amendment 
unconstitutionally burdens First Amendment rights, which the Court ultimately held 
to be correct). 
 253. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (exempting contributions to “clearly 
identified candidate[s]”). 
 254. Cf. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 174 (2003) (upholding contribution 
limits as not adversely affecting the relationship between national, state, and local 
political parties, but narrowly construing the ban to apply only to funds not raised in 
compliance with FECA). 
 255. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i (prohibiting all donations of soft money to political 
parties). 
 256. See id. § 441a(a)(1)(B), (1)(D), (3)(B) (limiting contributions to national 
political parties to $25,000 and to state political parties to $10,000; and preventing 
donations of  more than $57,500 in total to political committees). 
 257. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 658 (1994) (reiterating that 
Buckley requires that laws or regulations affecting the First Amendment rights of 
certain individuals and not of others be analyzed under strict scrutiny to determine if 
“the legislature’s speaker preference reflects a content preference”); see also Buckley 
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976) (rejecting an argument that the “First 
Amendment permits Congress to abridge the rights of some persons to engage in 
political expression in order to enhance the relative voice of other segments of our 
society”). 
Since a corporation or other organization deserves the same free speech and 
expression rights as an individual, it would follow logically that this inequality also 
affects corporations and their right of political expression.  See First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–83 (1978) (extending First Amendment 
protection to corporations when the expression is based on “public discussion and 
the dissemination of information and ideas.”).  But see Austin v. Mich. State Chamber 
of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657–61 (1990) (holding that corporations enjoy less 
First Amendment protection than real persons). 
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enjoy by creating asymmetrical contribution limitations that benefit 
non-self-financing candidates.258  The ban on the use of soft money 
increases the power and influence of third-party groups, celebrities, 
and the corporate media at the expense of political parties and 
wealthy contributors to those political parties.259  These regulations 
decrease the ability of specific individuals, namely the wealthy, to 
engage in certain types of political expression because Congress did 
not like the level of influence or alleged advantages those individuals 
had over others.260 
The Supreme Court has upheld campaign finance regulations 
requiring a candidate to make a choice regarding expenditures.261   
In Buckley, the Court allowed Congress to set conditions for 
candidates using public funds.262  However, the majority in Davis 
clearly distinguished that choice from the one forced upon wealthy 
candidates under the Millionaires’ Amendment because the 
regulation imposed a penalty on the candidates, no matter which 
choice they made.263  The soft-money ban also provides no recourse 
for wealthy individuals, groups, and political parties because it does 
not allow individuals or groups to donate or use even a limited 
amount of non-earmarked soft money.264 
Some may argue that the Millionaires’ Amendment and the ban on 
soft money are dissimilar because they implicate two divergent 
                                                          
 258. See Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008) (detailing the government’s 
argument that the Millionaires’ Amendment is necessary because strict contribution 
limits make it difficult for non-wealthy candidates to compete). 
 259. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 286 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (denouncing the soft-
money ban because it provides safe harbor to the “mainstream press” and forces 
speakers to abandon their own choice to speak through parties and organizations); 
Marcus & Eilperin, supra note 224, at A9 (“What we are doing is destroying the party 
system in America.  The political parties would be neutered, and third-party groups 
would run the show.” (quoting Congressman Martin Frost)). 
 260. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 (stressing that congressionally enacted 
regulations should not dictate which types of strengths should be exposed to the 
public and which should be limited). 
 261. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65 (“Congress may . . . condition acceptance of 
public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure 
limitations.”). 
 262. Id.  
 263. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772 (describing that conditions for the acceptance of 
public financing still allowed individuals the right to choose to opt out of public 
financing and spend as much money as they wanted).  With the Millionaires’ 
Amendment, however, candidates are either limited in the amount of personal funds 
they may spend, or if allowed to spend as much as they please, their opponent is then 
given much larger contribution limitations.  Id. 
 264. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 289 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (stating that the First 
Amendment problems with the legislation are obvious). 
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categories:  contributions and expenditures.265  This argument misses 
the larger problem inherent in both regulations:  they are examples 
of a legislative effort to diminish the influence of a certain group of 
people while intentionally expressing a preference for other 
individuals and groups.266  It is not Congress’s role to limit the 
quantity of certain individuals’ political speech in hopes of improving 
political speech as a whole.267  It is also unclear that either the 
Millionaires’ Amendment or the ban on the use of soft money would 
clearly produce that result.268  Additionally, after the holding in Davis, 
there is an inequality in the treatment of wealthy candidates and 
donors under existing campaign finance regulations.269  Justice Alito 
embraced the idea that individual strengths of candidates can be 
diverse and include being personally wealthy and “hav[ing] wealthy 
supporters who are willing to make large contributions.”270   
By choosing to diminish wealthy contributors, the ban on the use of 
soft money conflicts with the Davis holding because it allows 
Congress, instead of the voters, to decide which strengths should be 
heard and valued.271  Weary of the growing expansion of 
congressional involvement in the influencing of elections, the 
Roberts Court has developed a stricter anti-corruption rationale that 
considers the intent of the regulation.272  Similar to the Millionaires’ 
                                                          
 265. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 53 n.58 (finding that the use of personal funds directly 
facilitates speech, as opposed to contributions, which only express a general view). 
 266. See Kuhne, supra note 61, at 856 (explaining that the new limitations upheld 
by McConnell significantly limit the ability of parties to support “cash-strapped 
challengers,” and only allow transfers of non-monetary sources, such as media access 
and notoriety). 
 267. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 n.8 (describing the idea of controlling the 
quantity of political speech as dangerous); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 227 (stating that 
there is no legal right to have the same resources to influence the election process). 
 268. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 n.8 (discussing Justice Stevens’s suggestion that a 
limitation on the quantity of campaign speech would lead to an improvement in the 
quality of campaign speech, but concluding that there is no reason to believe such an 
effect would occur). 
 269. The ban on soft money significantly limits the ability of contributors to 
participate in political expression by generally supporting a political party.  See Conti, 
supra note 92, at 134 (denouncing the negative effects of the ban on the use of soft 
money because it overly burdens minority and female candidates).  Conversely, after 
Davis, wealthy candidates no longer face an unenviable choice between limiting their 
personal contribution to their campaign or allowing their opponent to enjoy 
liberalized contribution limitations.  See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2775 (holding the 
Millionaires’ Amendment to be unconstitutional). 
 270. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774. 
 271. See BeVier, supra note 100, at 83 (denouncing McConnell’s departure from 
Buckley “in favor of a vision of the more perfect democracy that they believed BCRA’s 
regulatory regime embodied”). 
 272. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 (“[I]t is dangerous business for Congress to use 
the election laws to influence the voters’ choices.”). 
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Amendment, the ban on soft money represents the intent of the 
legislature to diminish the influence of wealthy individuals by 
restricting their ability to support general party activities.273  Under 
the Roberts Court’s test, such intent is impermissible. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s recent campaign finance jurisprudence 
jeopardizes the future of McCain-Feingold’s controversial soft-money 
ban.  Compared to past decisions, the Roberts Court has developed a 
stricter anti-corruption analysis in recent campaign finance cases.  
The new analysis focuses on both the legislation’s actual anti-
corruption effect and the legislative intent behind the regulation.  
The ban on the use of soft money by political parties is similar to 
recent campaign finance regulations that the Roberts Court has 
declared as unconstitutional because it fails to achieve an actual anti-
corruption purpose, infringes too far on the rights of political parties 
to justify its supposed anti-corruption purpose, and represents a 
legislative choice to favor certain individuals and groups at the 
expense of wealthy donors.  The application of this test will have 
significant impact on American politics and all federal elections 
because it will provide the rationale to strike down the soft-money 
ban and other regulations that trespass too far into protected First 
Amendment grounds.274  This return to a strict anti-corruption 
analysis takes the power to influence and determine elections away 
from Congress and restores it to its proper place:  the American 
people.275 
Finally, lost behind the negative propaganda surrounding the 
participation of wealthy individuals in politics is the fact that large 
contributions to political parties can make a significant difference in 
reducing social ills.  As an example, J.K. Rowling, the wealthy British 
author, recently made donations of one million pounds to the British 
Labour Party.276  Rowling made the donations based on the party’s 
                                                          
 273. See 147 CONG. REC. 3853 (2001) (statement of Sen. McCain) (“As long as the 
wealthiest Americans and richest organized interests can make six and even seven 
figure donations to political parties . . . most Americans will dismiss the most virtuous 
politician’s claim of patriotism.”). 
 274. See Hasan, supra note 18, at 1106 (anticipating that under the Roberts Court’s 
campaign finance jurisprudence the soft money ban will likely be severely reduced in 
scope or eliminated altogether). 
 275. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774 (“The Constitution . . . confers upon voters, not 
Congress, the power to choose . . . .”). 
 276. See JK Rowling Gives Labour £1M Donation, GUARDIAN, Sept. 20, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2008/sep/20/labourconference.jkrowling 
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reputation for confronting child poverty.277  Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, the head of the Labour Party, graciously thanked the author 
for her generous donation and stated that the funds would be used to 
repay party debt but also to help support the party’s effort to address 
child poverty and related issues.278  Rowling, a wealthy contributor, 
was allowed to donate a large financial contribution to a political 
party of her choice based solely on the party’s general policy 
stances.279  In the not too distant future, individuals and groups here 
in the United States, who share the same support for our own 
political parties as Rowling, will again be able to express their support 
in a similar fashion. 
                                                          
(describing Rowling’s belief that poor families would fare better under the Labour 
party). 
 277. See id. (noting that Rowling supported Labour’s stance on child poverty 
instead of the Tory party’s support of tax breaks for married couples). 
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. (emphasizing that Rowling made her contribution because of the 
Labour party’s consistent advocacy for a cause she supports). 
